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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Michael Anthony Jenner for the Master of Arts in
History presented March 4, 2004.

Title:

The Origin of Portland, Oregon's Waterfront Park: A Paradigm Shift
in City Planning (1967-1978)

The present thesis chronicles the decision to replace Portland, Oregon's
Harbor Drive, a downtown highway located between Front Avenue and the
Willamette River, with Tom McCall Waterfront Park, a thirty-seven acre linear
greenway, in the late 1960s and 1970s. These events provide an example of the
battle against the ascendancy of the automobile and the ability of concerned
citizen groups to affect city planning decisions.
This thesis briefly outlines the history of Portland's waterfront and the
differing strategies the city employed to attempt to rehabilitate the area in the
first half of the twentieth century. It then examines the debate over the
proposed Ash Street ramp in 1961. The cancellation of the overpass project
marked the first time in Portland's history that waterfront beautification
advocates had influenced plans for the area. From there, the study focuses on
the events of 1969 in which the Portland City Club not only caused the

cancellation of Commissioner Frank Ivancie and State Highway Commission
Chair Glenn Jackson's unilateral plan to widen Harbor Drive but also
lambasted the secrecy of public officials. A few months later, the Riverfront for
People Committee, an organization made up mainly of young architects and
their spouses, galvanized professional planners and their allies and forced a
reevaluation of the function of the waterfront. These actions initiated a
paradigm shift in riverfront development planning from exclusivity to a more
inclusive process.
The thesis then examines the decision to close Harbor Drive in 1970 and
the complex conversion of the area from a highway to a park, placing these
developments within the context of transformations at Portland City Hall and
in urban planning in the United States. The study then describes the creation
and development of Waterfront Park in the mid 1970s and 1980s with an
emphasis on the role citizen participation and the input of professionals
played in the development of the park's "Final Report." Finally, the thesis
examines unforeseen problems that later developed in the park and the city's
response and explores the complex relationship between professional elites
and public participation.
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PREFACE

The present thesis describes the decision to replace Portland, Oregon's
Harbor Drive, a downtown highway located between Front Avenue and the
Willamette River, with Tom McCall Waterfront Park, a thirty-seven acre linear
greenway, in the late 1960s and 1970s. Portland historian Jewel Lansing has
argued that this transformation was not only a "stunning achievement'' but
was also one of the most important events in Portland's twentieth century
existence. In its twenty-five year history, Tom McCall Waterfront Park has
become Portland's most popular park and also a source of the city's civic
pride. 1
Previously, Portland historians had not explored this subject in-depth.
This, the first in-depth examination of the events that led to the decision to
eliminate Harbor Drive and the process of creating Waterfront Park, grew out
of the work of urban historian Carl Abbott. In Portland: Planning, Politics, and

Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (1983), Abbott described the general
political and city planning transitions that were taking place in Portland
during this period. In Greater Portland: Urban Life and Landscape in the Pacific

Northwest (2001), Abbott introduced the Riverfront for People Committee and
its 1969 campaign to transform the city's waterfront area.

1

"Future leaders do well to study past, author says," The Oregonian, 24 October 2003, p. Bl.

This thesis expands upon Abbott's work by examining the controversy
over the proposed Ash Street ramp in 1961, which pitted beautification
advocates, including the Oregon chapter of the American Institute of
Architects, against city officials. It chronicles in more detail the formation of
the City Club of Portland's Committee on the Journal Building Site and
Willamette Riverfront Development and analyzes their 1969 report, which
challenged the secrecy of planning for the area and offered a new philosophy
for the riverfront and downtown. This thesis, furthermore, expands upon how
the Riverfront for People Committee galvanized planning-oriented segments
of the community and forced a reevaluation of the function of the waterfront.
It also chronicles the complex conversion of the area from a highway to a park

in the 1970s and examines the unforeseen problems of Waterfront Park that
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.
The thesis addresses the question of why there was a transition from
exclusivity in city planning for the waterfront in the late 1960s and 1970s to
increased emphasis on broader community interests and values. This change
in urban planning was simultaneously occurring in other areas of Portland as
well as in other American cities. This thesis utilizes the general city planning
changes in Portland as well as those in Richmond, Virginia and Omaha,
Nebraska in an interpretive framework. The creation of Waterfront Park
provides an example of how a grassroots movement not only questioned the
prevailing planning philosophy of the ascendancy of the automobile but also
initiated a transformation in the city's attitude towards the riverfront and the
process of citizen participation. Information for the thesis came from city,

county, and state documents, the City Club of Portland's meeting minutes and
reports, the correspondence of the Riverfront for People Committee,
newspaper articles, and personal interviews.
The first chapter of this work briefly outlines the history of the
waterfront and the differing strategies the city employed to attempt to
rehabilitate the area in the first half of the twentieth century. The second
chapter chronicles the debate between city officials and beautification
advocates over the Ash Street ramp project in 1961. Portland's purchase of the
old Journal building as well as preliminary planning for the riverfront,
including the formation of Governor Tom McCall's Intergovernmental Task
Force for Waterfront Development in the late 1960s, is also discussed. The
third chapter describes the events of 1969 in which the City Club challenged a
plan by Commissioner Frank Ivancie and corporate leader and State Highway
Commission Chair Glenn Jackson to create a ten-lane freeway system in the
area. It also chronicles the formation of the Riverfront for People Committee
and its organizational drive demanding a more inclusive decision-making
process as well as the removal of Harbor Drive. The public hearing in October
1969 is also discussed.
The fourth chapter covers the decision to remove Harbor Drive and the
planning for the waterfront in the early 1970s. It chronicles the "Downtown
Plan," the cancellation of the proposed Mt. Hood Freeway project, and the
dramatic transition that took place in city hall. A discussion of city planning
changes that took place in Richmond, Virginia and Omaha, Nebraska during
this period is also included. The fifth chapter describes the creation and

development of Waterfront Park in the mid 1970s and 1980s. The Conclusion
briefly details problematic aspects of the park and the city's re-development
plan of 2003 and raises consideration of the complex relationship between
professional elites and public participation.

CHAPTER I
SETTING THE ST AGE: THE DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT AS A
PLANNING PROBLEM
Portland sits on the Willamette River, twelve miles south of the
Columbia River. Since the city's founding in 1843 and throughout the
nineteenth century, the riverfront area on the west bank provided a space for
Portland businesspeople to trade with the rest of the United States and the
world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Portland had emerged as
the center of power in the Northwest. Because of the city's commercial
activity, its population grew steadily from just over a thousand at
incorporation in 1851, to 149,000 in 1905. By the early 1910s, however, the
downtown area had moved west away from the river, the shipping area was
increasingly moving into northern Portland, and the downtown west side
riverfront had become decrepit. Most of the wharves and docks lining the
waterfront had been abandoned and were lying in a state of disrepair. 1
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Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (University of
Nebraska Press: Lincoln and London 1983), 11, 14-17, 19; E. Kimbark MacColl and Harry H.
Stein, Merchants, Money, and Power: the Portland Establishment 1843-1913 (The Georgian Press:
1988), 336-7, 390; Portland Parks and Recreation, City of Portland, Oregon, "Waterfront Park:
An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 16; idem, "Waterfront Park Master
Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 13-14; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul
Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco,
California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August
1975, Multnomah County Library, 20-21.

development of Waterfront Park in the mid 1970s and 1980s. The Conclusion
briefly details problematic aspects of the park and the city's re-development
plan of 2003 and raises consideration of the complex relationship between
professional elites and public participation.

CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE: THE DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT AS A
PLANNING PROBLEM
Portland sits on the Willamette River, twelve miles south of the
Columbia River. Since the city's founding in 1843 and throughout the
nineteenth century, the riverfront area on the west bank provided a space for
Portland businesspeople to trade with the rest of the United States and the
world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Portland had emerged as
the center of power in the Northwest. Because of the city's commercial
activity, its population grew steadily from just over a thousand at
incorporation in 1851, to 149,000 in 1905. By the early 1910s, however, the
downtown area had moved west away from the river, the shipping area was
increasingly moving into northern Portland, and the downtown west side
riverfront had become decrepit. Most of the wharves and docks lining the
waterfront had been abandoned and were lying in a state of disrepair. 1

1

Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (University of
Nebraska Press: Lincoln and London 1983), 11, 14-17, 19; E. Kimbark MacColl and Harry H.
Stein, Merchants, Money, and Power: the Portland Establishment 1843-1913 (The Georgian Press:
1988), 336-7, 390; Portland Parks and Recreation, City of Portland, Oregon, "Waterfront Park:
An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 16; idem, "Waterfront Park Master
Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library, 13-14; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul
Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey, San Francisco,
California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," August
1975, Multnomah County Library, 20-21.

Throughout the twentieth century, various city planning strategies for
Portland were drawn up. Each of these plans had specific suggestions for how
the riverfront should be utilized. The first of these was the Olmstead Plan of
1904, authored by the nationally renowned Olmstead Brothers of
Massachusetts, who were paid $10,000 to survey Portland's park potential and
suggest future park plans. The Olmsteads recommended the creation of a park
along the west side riverfront as a remedy for the dilapidated area. Even
though the Olmstead Plan resulted in the creation of a comprehensive park
system in Portland, including Sellwood Park and Mt. Tabor, no steps were
made towards the beautification of the riverfront. To some Portlanders, fresh
from the success of the Lewis and Clark Exhibition in 1905 promoting the
lifestyle of Portland and Oregon in general, the decayed, ugly waterfront was
a source of embarrassment. 2
As "Stumptown' s" population surpassed two hundred thousand in
1910, Edward Bennett, a colleague of Chicago's Daniel H. Burnham, who in
his 1909 comprehensive plans for his hometown had called for the
beautification of the lakefront, offered Portland's first far-reaching city plan
for the twentieth century. His "Greater Portland Plan" (1912) sought to
transform Portland into a city that one day would be a metropolis of two
million people. Bennett recommended not only a reinvigoration of the central
west side riverfront through the creation of a waterfront park, but also
2

Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 41, 59-60; Jewel Lansing, Portland: People,
Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University Press, Corvallis: 2003), 249, 252, 256,
394; E. Kirnbark MacColl, The Shaping of a City: Business and Politics in Portland, Oregon 18851915 (The Georgian Press Company, Portland, Oregon: 1976), 270-1.
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I

suggested the restoration of public ownership of the area. Even though the
voters of Portland overwhelmingly approved the concept of the Bennett Plan
in 1912, little resulted from these plans. This was due to the adamant
opposition from real estate and business interests as well as an economic
downturn that began in 1914. By the time the economy recovered in 1918, the
age of the automobile had made Edward Bennett's plans irrelevant. 3
It was not until the Laurgaard Plan of 1923 that concrete plans for

remedying the downtown waterfront took shape. In his 1920 report, city
engineer Olaf Laurgaard had detailed the deplorable condition of the
riverfront:" ... approximately seventy percent of the frontage ... between
Jefferson Street and the Steel Bridge has already been condemned,
recommended for condemnation or tom down." Laurgaard added that the
blighted area was becoming increasingly dangerous to traffic, a serious fire
hazard, and was causing high insurance rates for the downtown district. He
now proposed a comprehensive plan for the riverfront. Responding to the
periodic flooding of the waterfront area, including the catastrophic flood of
1894 in which high waters covered 250 square blocks, reaching to N.W. 10th

and Glisan and S.W. 61h and Washington, Laurgaard recommended the
building of a seawall between the Hawthorne and Steel bridges. The

3

Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 59, 62-68; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics,
and Power, 276, 284-85, 288, 301, 394; MacColl, The Shaping of a City, 423-31, 448-9; Portland
Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 17; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca
Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40.
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Laurgaard plan, furthermore, called for a new Front Avenue interceptor sewer
and pumping plant located along the new concrete seawall. 4
In an attempt to increase property values in the waterfront area and
downtown, Laurgaard proposed widening Front Avenue to one hundred feet
and building a public market on the riverfront between the Hawthorne and
Morrison bridges. He recommended, in addition, the creation of a tunneled
belt line railway with interurban terminals along a lighted esplanade. The City
Club objected to the Laurgaard Plan, however, on the grounds that the
improvements would not properly conserve the aesthetic values of the river
for the people of the city and would merely replace one blighted area with
another. The City Club of Portland, which was founded in 1916 by nine welleducated "forward-looking" men, sought to educate and inform the
community in public matters and encouraged people to get involved in local
issues. They also wanted to challenge the power structure of city hall. In
January 1917, in fact, the original members sponsored legislation that
strengthened the initiative and referendum process. 5
Even with the City Club's objections, Portland went forward with
implementing portions of the Laurgaard Plan. Because of the scarcity of

4

Portland City Planning Commission, "Major Traffic Street Plan Boulevard and Park System
for Portland Oregon" (Bulletin No. 7: 1921), Portland State University Library, 25 (first quote);
Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 97; E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City:
Power and Politics in Portland, Oregon 1915-1950 (The Georgian Press: 1979), 501-3; Portland
Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14; idem, "Waterfront Park: An
Assessment," 18.
5
Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 104; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and
Power, 300 (first quote); Ellis Lucia, The Conscience of a City: Fifty Years of City Club Service
(Portland, Oregon: The City Club of Portland, 1966), 10-14; Portland Parks and Recreation,
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14.
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available financing, however, city officials chose to build the sewer plant and
seawall, at a cost of two million dollars, but not the public market or the railline. These improvements, which were completed in 1929, led to the ripping
out of the rotted and decayed wharves and docks along the downtown
riverfront. Although the improvements assuaged Portland's sewage problem
and protected the downtown area against the high floodwaters of 1932, they
did not improve Front Avenue property values, which declined by an average
of 38 percent in the decade between 1926 and 1936. 6
Planning for Laurgaard' s Public Market Building began in 1926 at the
initiative of a Seattle developer. The building was to replace the farmers'
market along S.W. Yamhill Street. Although the old market had been
financially successful, it lacked parking as well as sufficient street access. Due
to a series of financing complications, however, the planned public market on
the waterfront was stalled until 1931, when the Portland Chamber of
Commerce board of directors unanimously approved the construction of the
building. Later that year, despite the adamant opposition of Commissioner
Ralph Clyde, who was the leading liberal in city hall, Mayor George Baker,
along with commissioners John Mann and Earl Riley, voted to assume
ownership of the project and to issue utility certificates to finance it. The
council even attached an emergency clause to the ordinance that enabled it to

6

Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 316-17; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 501-3;
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14; idem, "Waterfront Park:
An Assessment," 18; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown
Waterfront Park," 21.
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go into effect within one month, thus eliminating the possibility of a popular
referendum halting the project.7
Indeed, opinion in Portland was deeply divided over the location of the
planned building. Importantly, the market businesspeople as well as the
petitions of 18,000 market customers were opposed to the move, arguing that
the proposed building along the waterfront was too far away from the retail
core. Despite serious opposition to the scheme, the city council took-out a
$775,000 Reconstruction Finance Loan for the Market Building in 1932. Later
that year, however, Baker, who was the first four-term mayor in Portland's
history, commissioners Mann and Riley, Olaf Laurgaard, and contractor C.
Lee Wilson were investigated for their involvement in the project. The officials
were accused of taking bribes and paying $200,000 too much for the riverfront
site. Even though the charges against the men were later dismissed,
Portlanders recalled Mann and almost recalled Baker. 8
When it opened in 1933, the two-square block Public Market Building
was advertised as the largest municipal market structure in the world and
included one hundred shops and three hundred stalls with some two miles of
counters. Ironically, approximately two hundred produce vendors protested
against the new building by forming an alternative cooperative market on

7

Commissioner Ralph Clyde, who had called the Public Market Building project a "White
Elephant in the making," served on the city council for sixteen years until his death in 1943. In
1931, the council passed a resolution sponsored by Clyde to study the possibility of creating a
municipally owned electric power system in Portland. Even though the resolution had much
support, the council in 1933, by a three to two vote, refused to refer the matter to the voters.
Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 319, 322-23, 325, 526n131 (first quote, 526n131);
Maccoll, The Growth of a City, 421-23, 488-99.
8
Ibid.
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S.W. Yamhill Street. The financial rewards from the white elephant never
materialized and in 1934, city officials refused to buy the structure from the
privately held Public Market Company on the grounds that the firm had
mismanaged the project so badly that the city would not be able to sell the
municipal bonds to finance the project. The Public Market Company then
sued Portland and the RFC for not making good on the contract. In 1942, the
Oregon Supreme Court ruled the city liable for damages plus interest;
Portland appealed the decision. 9
On January 1, 1943, the Public Market Company closed the building.
After that, the U.S. Navy leased the Public Market during World War II to
store shipbuilding materials. In 1946, with the Second World War over, the
property was sold to the Oregon Journal for $750,000 and was converted into a
printing plant. That same year, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that although
the city was not the owner of the property, it was liable for damages for failure
to carry out the conditions of the original contract. In 1947, the lawsuit over
the waterfront building was finally settled as the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to hear an appeal from the city, forcing Portland to pay over a million dollars
to the RFC and the Public Market Company .10
By the early 1930s, Portland faced the dilemma of what to do with the
land between Front Avenue and the seawall. The Bartholomew Plan of 1932,
prepared by Harland Bartholomew and Associates, recognized as one of the

9

Ibid.; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 108; Portland Parks and Recreation,
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 15; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 19.
lOJbid.
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leading planning consultant firms in the nation, attempted to appease groups
like the City Club that demanded a waterfront park to revitalize the riverfront
area and increase property values in lower downtown and interests desiring
construction of a rail-line. Bartholomew suggested the widening of Front
Avenue, the building of a tunneled rail-line, and the creation of an
underground parking garage for 2,500 cars. The report also recommended the
creation of a park with mixed uses in the two hundred foot wide space
between Front Avenue and the Willamette River seawall. Both the city council
and Portland Planning Commission ignored Bartholomew's call for a
waterfront park, despite having paid $24,000 for the study. 11
Proceeding on its own accord in 1935, city officials made concrete plans
for improving Front Avenue and the downtown waterfront. It now approved
construction of a highway along the harbor wall with underpasses at the
bridges. Harbor Drive would be an express six-lane highway with connections
to Barbur Boulevard to the south, and to the three bridges lining the
waterfront. At the Public Market Building, however, the width of the white
elephant cut Harbor Drive down to four lanes. Front Avenue, which was to be
widened by twenty feet, would be utilized as a service street. A narrow strip
of park would be built between Front Avenue and Harbor Drive and an
esplanade would be erected on top of the seawall. Not surprisingly, the City
Club objected to the proposed plan in their 1937 report, "The Development of

11

Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 104-08; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and
Power, 322, 394; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 499-501, 521-2; Portland Parks and Recreation,
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 14; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 17.
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Front Avenue," which recommended utilizing the waterfront area between
the Morrison and Burnside bridges as a park. Furthermore, it suggested
expanding Front Avenue to facilitate the movement of traffic to the west side
business district. The City Club Committee, however, was uncertain about
how to finance such a plan. Ultimately, the City Club proposal would tum out
to be similar to the plan enacted in the 1970s that resulted in the creation of
Waterfront Park and the Front Avenue artery.12
By 1940, however, both Portland and the State Highway Commission
were moving forward with the plans from 1935 for the ten-lane highway
system. The total cost of the project was estimated at just over four million
dollars, with the highway commission providing nearly three million dollars.
To pay for the remaining $1.25 million, city officials put forth an initiative in
May 1940 calling for the voters to pay the balance. It was believed by city
officials that the Front Avenue Bond Issue would rehabilitate the waterfront
area, stabilize property values in the downtown area, and relieve traffic
congestion. On May 17, 1940, Portland voters approved the bond issue with 65
percent voting in favor. The dream of a west side waterfront park appeared
dead. The construction of Harbor Drive, which opened in 1942, resulted in the
demolition of seventy-nine houses and other buildings. Furthermore, the
widening of Front Avenue caused the razing of numerous buildings from
Portland's pioneer days. Harbor Drive allowed only a 16-foot sidewalk next to

12

"The Development of Front Avenue," Portland City Club Bulletin 17 (Portland: City Club of
Portland, 12 March 1937), 143-146.

9

the river with a row of trees. The esplanade was not only dangerous to access
but was noisy as well. 13
By the beginning of World War II, Portland's population had grown to
305,000. During the Second World War, however, the city's size exploded as

approximately 72,000 workers and their families flooded the area in search of
war-related jobs, particularly in the Kaiser shipyards. Kaiser was responsible
for hiring nearly 70 percent of Portland's total war labor force. This great
influx of people caused an enormous strain on both housing and traffic. Yet
during World War II, the War Production Board prohibited all highway and
street construction unrelated to the war effort. In a 1944 survey of Kaiser's
91,000 Portland workers, approximately 52 percent wanted to remain in the

area after the war. City leaders were concerned that when the war ended
Portland would suffer from massive unemployment. To combat this situation,
City Commissioner of Public Works William A. Bowes appointed the Portland
Area Postwar Development Committee (P APDC) to help plan for the post-war
period.14
In 1943, the PAPDC hired nationally renowned city planner Robert
Moses, who was the New York City Park Commissioner, to plan for public
works projects in the years following the war. Later that year, Moses
published Portland Improvement, which proposed a $60 million construction
program to employ approximately 20,000 workers in the first two years after
13

Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 216; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and
Power, 335; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 507-18; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront

Park Master Plan," 15; idem, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 18.
Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 125-30, 131-38; Lansing, Portland: People,
Politics, and Power, 339, 342, 347; MacColl, The Growth of a City, 571-84.

14
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the war. At its core, Portland Improvement was a traffic engineer's solution to a
complex urban problem. With reference to the downtown waterfront, Robert
Moses recommended that the riverfront be developed into an attractive park.
This included the planting of trees, beds for roses and other flowers, and
landscaped malls. Moses' plan kept the existing ten-lane highway system,
however. The total construction and land cost of Moses' proposal was $2.5
million. Moses also proposed a twenty block civic center along Front Avenue,
between S.W. Salmon and Columbia streets. Nevertheless, neither of Robert
Moses' proposals for the west side riverfront became reality as Portland voters
defeated bond measures to pay for the plans. 15
In 1949, the State Highway Commission, despite the opposition of the
city council, eliminated the numerous parking strips and other undeveloped
areas located between the harbor wall and Front Avenue and replaced them
with landscaped parks. The council had argued that they did not have the
funds to maintain the park areas. In the 1950s, the highway commission
fought to convert Harbor Drive from an expressway to a limited-access
freeway with as few impediments to traffic flow as possible. The commission
fought intersections across Harbor Drive and made plans to eliminate signals
and crossings. In the mid-1950s, the highway commission began building a
series of overhead ramps to better facilitate traffic flow between the highway
and the west side business district. Although the $960,000 project linked
Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 138-40; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and
Power, 334-35, 394; Maccoll, The Growth of a City, 587-91; Robert Moses, Portland Improvement

15

(New York City: 1943), 7, 11, 22, 26, 38, 40; Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park
Master Plan," 15.
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Harbor Drive with S.W. Market, Clay, Columbia, and Jefferson streets, it
further obscured the esplanade and the Willamette River. In 1957, the Front
Avenue Project was finally completed. Barbur Boulevard was now linked to
Interstate Avenue via Front Avenue and the Steel Bridge. The project had
taken seventeen years, with a five-year hiatus during World War II, to
complete. 16
By the late 1950s, the inability of pedestrians to safely cross the ten-lane
riverfront highway to access the esplanade was increasingly becoming a
concern. For most of the year, the waterfront esplanade was scarcely utilized.
During the Rose Festival, however, thousands of Portlanders flooded the area,
particularly the section between the Burnside and Morrison bridges. A major
attraction of the festival was the numerous U.S. Navy and Royal Canadian
Navy ships moored along the seawall that annually visited the Rose City. In
1959, it was estimated that 160,000 people boarded these ships for tours while
an additional 500,000 people visited the esplanade to see the ships. 17
In the fall of 1959, Mayor Terry Schrunk argued that in order to better
handle the Rose Festival crowds two pedestrian bridges linking downtown
with the esplanade be built: one between the Burnside and Morrison bridges
and another between the Morrison and Hawthorne bridges. Shrunk stated,
"The full enjoyment of [the riverfront area] can only be accomplished in safety
through the use of overpasses .... " It was estimated that each of the pedestrian
bridges would cost $15,000. Some city officials, however, objected to Shrunk's
16
17

MacColl, The Growth of a City, 513-18.
Terry Schrunk to Milo Mciver, 16 June 1959, Ernest Bonner, personal files.

12

plan. City Traffic Engineer W.J. Weller, in a letter to the Highway Engineering
Coordinator Fred Fowler, argued that the bridges would be a waste of money
because not only would they not be able to handle the volume of pedestrians
during the Rose Festival, but also, unless a fence were installed along Harbor
Drive, indiscriminate pedestrian crossing of the highway would continue. In
the end, however, Mayor Schrunk was able to get one pedestrian overpass
built in 1960, the Bailey Bridge, at the foot of Morrison Street. 18
Between 1900 and 1959, Portland struggled in its attempts to plan for
the utilization of the west side downtown riverfront. Furthermore, despite
numerous recommendations from outside planners to build a park along the
waterfront, including the Olmstead Plan of 1904, Bennett's "Greater Portland
Plan" (1912), the Bartholomew Plan of 1932, and Moses' Portland Improvement
(1943), city officials instead moved forward with improved infrastructure
projects, the building of the white elephant, and the construction of a six-lane
highway. When Harbor Drive was completed in 1942, a sixteen-foot esplanade
precariously hugged the river's edge. By the 1950s, it was increasingly
apparent that the public space allocated for the annual Rose Festival was
inadequate.

18
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CHAPTER II
GOVERNOR TOM McCALL AND PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR A
RIVERFRONT PARK
As the 1960s began, Portland officials moved forward with plans to
build another vehicle ramp linking Harbor Drive with the downtown core.
Even though the proposed four-block long, thirty-foot high Ash Street ramp,
situated between the Morrison and Burnside bridges, would have also been
utilized as a pedestrian bridge to better accommodate the Rose Festival
crowds, the project threatened to further obscure the downtown west side
waterfront. The push to build the overpass was heavily influenced by a 1959
study by the Portland Traffic Engineering Department, which showed that the
intersection at Oak Street, two blocks south of Ash Street, where northbound
S.W. Harbor Drive traffic turned into the downtown area, "involved very
hazardous traffic movement." On January 25, 1961, the State Highway
Department held a public hearing at the Portland City Council Chambers
regarding the Ash Street overpass where there were no serious objections to
the project. On May 3, the city council passed Ordinance 113497, which
authorized an agreement between the highway commission and the city to
build the overpass. 1

1

Portland City Planning Commission, "Ash Street Ramp Report and Recommendations," 24
July 1961, Portland City Archives, 4-6.

When the city attempted in mid-May to contract out the work to build
the Ash Street ramp, however, a ground swell of opposition emerged. The
fight against the overpass was endorsed and highly publicized in both the

Oregonian and the Oregon Journal starting on May 19 and continuing into June.
Both daily newspapers urged the highway commission and city council to
consider alternative plans, such as an Ash Street underpass. Opponents of the
ramp wanted to save the last unobstructed section along the esplanade of the
downtown waterfront, one that was utilized as an integral feature of the Rose
Festival week as thousands of Portlanders visited the navy ships moored
along the riverfront. Opponents of the project argued, furthermore, that the
overpass would obscure the soon to be completed renewal of Skidmore
Fountain park, begun in 1959, as well as historic riverfront property along
Front Avenue. In its May 26 editorial "Save a Stretch of River Front," the

Oregon Journal argued that, "an elevated highway structure would be a cruel
companion for these features." The editorial ended with a call to arms to
pressure city officials to reconsider the plan. 2
On May 31, the city council held a hearing to listen to protests against

the Ash Street ramp. Proponents of the overpass were led by Portland
Highway Coordinator Fred Fowler, who argued that alternate plans for an
Ash Street underpass had been deemed unfeasible due to it being too steep,
too susceptible to flooding, and too close to an intercepting sewer.
Furthermore, he stated that with the soon to be opened I-5, connecting Salem
2
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and Portland, an additional 7,000 vehicles per day would utilize the Oak
Street interchange. If the Ash Street ramp were not built, Fowler argued, an
impossible traffic situation would ensue. Opposing any delay of the project,
he insisted that other than during the Rose Festival, there had not been a
"corporal's guard" utilizing the esplanade area. "We must decide between our
desire to live in the past and our desire to improve conditions and go forward
for a greater Portland," concluded Fowler, "In this decision lies the answer to
whether downtown Portland will survive." 3
Opponents of the Ash Street ramp were led by Dan McGoodwin and
Lewis Crutcher of the Civic Design Committee of the Oregon Chapter of the
American Institute of Architects (AIA). The AIA's Oregon chapter was
founded in Portland in 1911, reflecting the large number of architects drawn to
the rapidly growing area, especially following the Lewis and Clark Exposition
of 1905. An exodus of architects from the area, however, occurred during the
building slump of the 1910s and particularly during the Great Depression of
the 1930s. As the Northwest's economy rebounded after the Second World
War, architects were once again drawn to the area. AIA member Dan
McGoodwin, who had moved to Portland after serving in the U.S. Navy
during World War II, had refurbished a building at S.W. Ash Street and 10th in
the late 1950s, which he believed would have been adversely effected by the
proposed overpass. "I believed it was my civic duty as an architect to fight for
the beautification of the city," recalled McGoodwin. Lewis Crutcher, who had

3
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moved to Portland from his hometown of Seattle in 1951, was widely
respected as a "crusader" for the rehabilitation of aging cities. He had also
assisted in redesigning the Skidmore Fountain area. In 1966, Portland
architects presented Crutcher with an Award of Commendation for "his
courageous dedication combating civic ugliness .... " 4
Both McGoodwin and Crutcher insisted that not only must an
acceptable alternative be found to avoid "defacement of a great asset," but
that the idea for an underpass, contrary to Fred Fowler's opinion, was in fact
feasible. Portland had bungled chance after chance to take advantage of the
beauty of the Willamette River, McGoodwin stated, and the Ash Street
overpass, if built, would be another sad chapter in this history. Crutcher stated
that this was a battle between people and machines and that contrary to the
beliefs of many in city hall, "that is our waterfront." He summed up his
argument by advocating mass transit over "giving priority to automobiles and
sewage." After loud applause from the audience, Mayor Terry Shrunk
admonished that, "[d]emonstrations are not appropriate in the Council. This is
not a popularity contest or anything of that nature." 5
Terry Shrunk, who served as mayor for sixteen years (1957-72), was a
Multnomah County sheriff for eight years and before that was a Portland fire
captain. In April 1956, the Oregonian launched an expose accusing the
4
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Teamsters union, who were supporting Democrat Schrunk against incumbent
Republican Mayor Fred Peterson, of attempting to take over law enforcement
and government in Multnomah County, and eventually in Oregon. That
summer, Schrunk was accused of taking a bribe from the Teamsters while he
was sheriff in 1955. Even with these accusations, he trounced Peterson in the
fall election, becoming only the fourth Democratic mayor in the city's first
eighty-five years. In March 1957, shortly after Schrunk took office, a state
grand jury indicted him for bribery and perjury. At the perjury trial in June,
however, he was found not guilty. Portland historian Jewel Lansing has
suggested that the "negative publicity [and] humiliation ... of the trial"
changed Schrunk from an "'open, easy-going liberal' to a 'much more
suspicious, cautious, and conservative' person." 6
Veteran Commissioner Ormond Bean, who was not only an architect
but also had been president of the AIA's Oregon chapter during the mid1920s, agreed with McGoodwin and Crutcher and moved to postpone a
decision on the project for thirty days for further study. During his long career
in city politics, Bean was often the leading liberal on councils that were
dominated by conservatives. During the 1930s, for example, Mayor Joseph
Carson, Jr., along with commissioners Earl Riley and the "Red-baiting" Jake
6
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Bennett often outvoted Bean and fellow progressive Ralph Clyde to "keep the
New Deal out of Portland." Commissioner Mark "Buck" Grayson, who had
served as Bean's administrative assistant for ten years before being elected to
the council in 1959, joined his former boss in approving the postponement.7
Commissioner William Bowes, a staunch conservative who served on
the council for thirty years (1939-69), the longest tenure in Portland's history,
and who modeled himself after Robert Moses in proposing engineering
solutions to city problems, such as the Ash Street ramp, responded angrily to
Bean and Grayson's motion. "Autocrat" Bowes, whom city historian Carl
Abbott described as suffering from an "arrogance of success," referred to the

Oregonian as an "ivory tower" institution and to the opponents of the project
as "Sidewalk Superintendents" and "long-hairs." He argued that if the city
did not go forward with the ramp construction, the highway commission
would abandon the project and send the money elsewhere. Fred Fowler
responded that the proposed motion was a useless delay. Bowes along with
"longtime ally" Stanley Earl (1953-70), as well as Mayor Shrunk agreed, voting

7

Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 324, 328, 332-34, 352, 353, 357-59, 362, 36566, 379-80, 382, 383, 390-91 (first quote, 328); Carl Abbott, Portland: Gateway to the Northwest
(American Historical Press: Tarzana, California: 1997), 110-11 (second quote, 110); Portland
City Council, Minutes, 31May1961, Portland City Archives, 181-82; "Bean Once 100 Pound
Quarterback," The Oregon Journal, 26 June 1960, 2; Ex-city official Bean, 89, dies," The
Oregonian, 15 February 1975, 1; "Ormond Bean leaves long civic record," The Oregonian, 15
February 1975, 18; "Bid Shunned By Grayson," The Oregonian, 16 January 1970, l; "Grayson
Favors 'Wide Open' Contest," The Oregonian, 16 January 1970, 14; "Mark Grayson dead at 73,"
The Oregon Journal, 25 July 1981, 2; Carl Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 111-12,
117, 157, 159; E. Kimbark MacColl, The Growth of a City, 494, 532, 534, 536, 589.

19

down the motion, thus moving forward with construction of the Ash Street
ramp.8
The reaction to the city council's vote was swift and aggressive. In its
editorial on June 2 entitled "Beauty Be Damned," the Oregonian argued that
the protesters received "short shift" by the council's refusal to grant a thirtyday reprieve. Furthermore, the newspaper pointed out that, contrary to Fred
Fowler's statements, an idea for an underpass at Ash Street was actually quite
feasible: not only had the Portland City Planning Commission proposed two
underpasses beneath Harbor Drive in 1952, but the grading problem could be
solved by simply raising the grade of Front A venue a few feet to provide the
necessary clearance for the underpass. The newspaper also called for the
public to get involved and stop the project. If not, they declared," ... this will
be the last Rose Festival when Navy ships will stand out bravely against the
seawall. Next Rose Festival they will be blotted out by a concrete
8
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monstrosity." The Oregonian also printed Commissioner Bowes' council
statement in its entirety. 9
Opposition to the Ash Street ramp project continued to mount in the
first half of June; in fact, a large group of protesters visited the highway
department and Bowes' office to object to the city council's decision to go
forward with the project. On June 13, Bowes was forced to authorize the
planning commission to review the studies of the highway department and
Highway Coordinator Fred Fowler regarding the ramp as well as examine
Dan McGoodwin and Lewis Crutcher' s underpass idea. The commission was
instructed to complete its report in time for presentation at the highway
department hearing in Salem on July 28. 10
On July 25, the planning commission published its findings in" Ash

Street Ramp Report and Recommendations." The commission had concluded
by a unanimous vote that neither the Ash Street overpass nor the alternate
underpass should be built before further studies could be conducted. It also
stated that the ramp would have only dealt with the immediate traffic
problem but would not have been a long-range solution. The commission
concluded that a future plan should not harm the waterfront area between the
Morrison and Burnside bridges, should be more cost effective (the cost of the
underpass was estimated at nearly $2 million compared to $500,000 for the
overpass), and should successfully deal with long-term traffic problems. The
report stated that only after the highway department's Origin and Destination
9
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study, dealing with traffic movement in Portland, was released in 1962 should
possible consideration be given to expensive projects such as the Ash Street
overpass or underpass. The commission also recommended the
implementation of an interim plan, which called for minor changes in the
Harbor Drive/Front Avenue highway system, to deal with the immediate
problem of northbound traffic. 11
"Ash Street Ramp Report and Recommendations" was a clear victory
for opponents of the overpass as it was an influential argument for
abandoning the project. A few hours after the release of the commission's
report, Commissioner Ormond Bean declared that he would seek a
postponement of the project at the next city council meeting. "Some better
way of handling the traffic will be found," insisted Bean. Commissioner
Bowes was less enthusiastic, declaring that the commission had not taken a
"realistic position" and that the traffic problem was so bad that the city could
not afford to wait for more studies to be compiled. Meanwhile, Dan
McGoodwin declared that the report represented "the best interests of the
city." 12
The Ash Street overpass debate concluded at the city council meeting
on August 3, as the council unanimously voted to cancel the May 26
agreement between the city and the highway commission, thus killing the
project. Mayor Terry Schrunk now came to the aid of embattled
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Commissioner Bowes, arguing that contrary to widespread belief, it was he,
and not Bowes, who had initiated the plan for the ramp. Furthermore,
Schrunk added, " .. .I think Commissioner Bowes has been subjected
unmercifully to the most unfair, unrealistic criticism." Even after the vote to
cancel the project had been cast, an acrimonious exchange between Everett
"Barney" Franks, the president of the Oregon chapter of the American
Institute of Architects, and Mayor Schrunk ensued. Franks volunteered that he
applauded the city's new emphasis on "human values." Schrunk responded,
"Did you say something about safety? Are you concerned about that?
... Beauty is nice, but it's pretty hard to enjoy it from a hospital bed." Plans for
the Ash Street ramp were shelved pending further study.13
On February 20, 1962, the planning commission released its staff report,

"Comprehensive Downtown Study-Harbor Drive Access," a follow-up study
to "Ash Street Ramp and Recommendations." The commission now declared
that since the opening of I-5, contrary to Fred Fowler's predictions, there had
been no significant increase in the volume of traffic utilizing the northbound
Harbor Drive I Oak Street tum-off. The report, however, noted that there had
been a significant 17 percent increase in the usage of the Clay Street ramp. The
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planners concluded that there was no reason why the Ash Street ramp project
should be re-examined. 14
The success of the protesters in stopping the construction of the
planned overpass was significant because it was the first time beautification
advocates had been able to influence the plans for development of the
downtown waterfront. As the Oregonian noted in a May 1961 editorial, "Last
Chance," construction of the Ash Street ramp would have closed off
opportunities of creating a viable riverfront park on the west bank of the
Willamette River. The opponents of the overpass project thus not only saved
the last unobstructed section along the riverfront, but they also provided a
chance for beautification advocates in the late 1960s to push for a major park
to line the downtown waterfront. Both the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, in
the name of civic pride, had played a critical role in informing the public
regarding the status of the city and state plans for the Ash Street ramp, and in
helping organize the opposition to the project. 15
Mayor Terry Schrunk had suggested in a 1961 letter to the planning
commission that the entire area from Market Street to the Steel Bridge and
from the esplanade to at least Fourth Avenue be studied for possible
rehabilitation or urban renewal. Schrunk had long championed the idea of
urban renewal as a means of fighting off trends of downtown "obsolescence"
by creating a "building boom." As urban historian Carl Abbott has explained
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in Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (1983),
much of the success of Portland's urban renewal was due to the influence of
Shrunk's colleague, Ira Keller, who was president of the Western Kraft
Corporation, which produced cardboard boxes and other paper packing
material, and chair of the Portland Development Commission (PDC) from its
organization in 1958 until 1972, an agency Shrunk created to deal with
"redevelopment and civic promotion." Keller, who was born in Portland,
Maine, had moved out west from Chicago in 1953 in order to be closer to the
pulp supplies. Two years after the mayor's letter to the planning commission,
the city council formally asked the agency to study the downtown waterfront
as a possible urban renewal site. Yet little action was taken in dealing with the
riverfront area. 16
Despite a reluctance to contemplate the creation of park space on the
waterfront, Portland officials began to make plans to buy the old Journal
Building in the mid-1960s to better utilize the downtown riverfront. The

Oregon Journal had operated out of the 'white elephant' from 1948 until the
newspaper was bought out by the Oregonian Publishing Co. in 1961. In the
early to mid-1960s, the Oregonian had used the building to store newsprint
and equipment and also made it available to charitable organizations. For a
period, even the Oregon Historical Society had used the old Journal Building
16
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as a storage site. Increasingly, however, it became clear that something had to
be done with the building. Not only did the building cause traffic problems on
Harbor Drive (it was so wide that it cut the highway down from six to four
lanes) but it also restricted plans for redeveloping the riverfront area. By 1967,
plans were in full swing for Portland to purchase the structure. One of the first
plans that emerged in August 1967 involved Lewis and Clark College
acquiring the building as a gift from the Newhouse interests, who owned the

Oregonian, who would then sell it to the city for approximately $750,000 to
have it tom down. The plan called for realigning and widening Harbor Drive
to six lanes in that area while creating a park along the Willamette River.17
In October 1967, the planning commission published "Downtown
Waterfront," its study of possible uses for the downtown riverfront. The
commission declared three major objectives in its strategy: removal of the old

Journal Building to eliminate the traffic bottleneck, better vehicular access to
the east section of downtown, and reclamation of the riverfront through the
building of a pedestrian friendly waterfront park. The planners also
recommended depressing Harbor Drive, moving it slightly away from the
river, and building pedestrian ramps to the greenway area. Furthermore, they
called for the building of four automobile ramps to improve vehicular access
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to downtown. For the riverfront park, the commission recommended utilizing
the northern area, between the Morrison and Burnside bridges, for Rose
Festival activities, including the annual visit by the navy fleet. For the
southern section of the park, between the Morrison and Hawthorne bridges,
the planning commission put forth the idea of developing a marina,
restaurant, and nightclub area. The commission envisioned the waterfront
park as a center of activity that, because of pedestrian accessibility to the
downtown, could rejuvenate the area between Third and Front avenues. 18
In February 1968, Mayor Schrunk commissioned Frank Ivancie, the
commissioner of public affairs, to explore plans for the old Journal Building
and the surrounding area, and to report back to the city council. Ivancie, who
had served as Schrunk' s executive assistant from 1959 to 1967, was considered
the second most conservative person on the council, behind Bowes. He was
also heavily reliant on the business community and on city employee unions,
especially the firefighters, who funded his campaigns. In his letter to Glenn
Jackson, chair of the highway commission, Schrunk suggested that long-range
plans for the area should involve solving the bottleneck caused by the
waterfront structure as well as extending the existing greenway along the
riverfront. 19
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On April 11, Ivancie reported back to the city council suggesting that
the best solution was the removal of the old Journal Building so as to provide
for a mile-long riverfront park, ranging from eighty to one hundred feet wide,
between the Steel and Hawthorne bridges and the widening of Harbor Drive
from four to six lanes. "In my opinion," he stated, "the acquisition of the
Oregon Journal Building in itself is the key to unlock the full potential of a
beautiful riverfront development in Portland. At the same time, we will be
able to resolve a critical traffic problem." Ivancie estimated that purchasing
the white elephant would cost around $1.3 million but added that the
highway commission was willing to share acquisition and demolition costs on
a fifty-fifty basis. 20
On the same day that Ivancie detailed his findings to the city council,

the Portland City Traffic Engineer's Office, which included Fred Fowler, met
with representatives of the State Highway Department to discuss the possible
relocation of Harbor Drive. After considerable preliminary discussion, the
group determined that a relocated Harbor Drive should be as close to Front
A venue as possible in order to ensure the maximum amount of greenway area
between the highway and the Willamette River. They also determined,
however, that not only would pedestrian movements across Harbor Drive be
prohibited at all times, except during the week-long Rose Festival, but that
any pedestrian ramps to serve the esplanade would be the city's
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responsibility. The group also discussed the possibility of converting Front
Avenue into a one-way northbound street, with First Avenue becoming oneway southbound in order to create more space for the riverfront greenway.
City and state plans to purchase the old Journal Building were announced on
April 9, 1968.21
Prospects for the city and state's version of a riverfront greenway
quickly came under fire from beautification advocates. On April 26, 1968, John
Bolan, president of the Portland Beautification Association, challenged the
greenway plan in a strongly worded letter to the city council. The
beautification association, which had been created in 1960 by Mayor Schrunk
to coordinate long-range plans for improving the city's aesthetic environment,
included over fifty committee members representing over thirty clubs,
organizations, and professional groups in the Portland area. Among the
groups' initial tasks was the beautification of the waterfront. Bolan, an
advertising and credit manager for the Charles H. Lilly Company, specializing
in agricultural products, now insisted that for the riverfront park to have any
meaning, it would need to be much wider than the proposed eighty to one
hundred feet. He stated, furthermore, that because future traffic studies of the
area showed diminished use, there was the potential for removing Harbor
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Drive entirely in order to ensure a great waterfront park. This was the first
plan that called for the complete removal of Harbor Drive.22
On May 23, the city council agreed to buy the old Journal Building for

$1.3 million. The contract called for the city to make a $400,000 down payment
and annual installments of $300,000 for three years. Commissioner lvancie,
who negotiated the sale on behalf of the city, called the transaction" ... one of
the most significant milestones in Portland's history." Fred Stickel, the
general-manager of the Oregonian Publishing Company, noted that he had
given the city first preference and price consideration in order to ensure the
creation of a park space on the waterfront. Per an agreement with the highway
commission, the state would pay half the cost for relocating Harbor Drive
west next to Front Avenue. Mayor Schrunk announced that the esplanade
would be named the Francis J. Murnane Parkway in honor of the recently
deceased president of the Longshoremen's Union. 23
With the purchase of the waterfront structure, plans for the future of
the downtown riverfront accelerated. By June, city officials were considering
three possibilities. In Plan "A," Front Avenue would remain a two-way street
with some minor changes. Harbor Drive would be relocated alongside Front
22
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Avenue, allowing for between eighty and one hundred feet in width between
the highway and the Willamette River. Because the esplanade was twenty feet
wide, however, there would be only sixty to eighty feet for landscape
development; this is approximately the width of the south Park Blocks. In Plan
"B," Harbor Drive would be relocated to the west and Front A venue would be
narrowed to forty-four feet for four northbound lanes only. This would allow
for an additional fifty-foot area for the entire length of the riverfront park.
Both Plans" A" and "B" were each estimated to cost $500,000. Plan "C," or the
cut-and-cover plan, would have followed the same general alignment as Plan
"B," except that the grade would be lowered between S.W. Salmon Street and
S.W. Stark Street to allow for a cut and fill tunnel section as well as a five-foot
earth cover for future landscaping. This would allow for an area 235 feet wide
by 1,360 feet long between Front Avenue and the Willamette River. Plan "C'
was patterned after the proposed Delaware Expressway (Interstate 95) in
Philadelphia and was projected to cost $4,725,000. 24
On July 1, the City Club of Portland engaged in the waterfront

controversy by establishing the Committee on the Journal Building Site and
Riverfront Development. The panel was chaired by power section chief for the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers David J. Lewis and included future
commissioner and mayor Neil Goldschmidt. Goldschmidt, who in 1964 had
assisted civil rights groups in Mississippi, was working as a legal aide for
antipoverty and community groups in southeast Portland. The committee's
Fred T. Fowler to Francis J. Ivancie, "Preliminary Report on the proposed West Side
Waterfront Development," 28 June 1968, Bonner, personal files.
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mission was to study the disposition of the old Journal Building, proposals and
costs for utilization of the site, financing issues of each proposal, and make
recommendations for best possible uses of the area. Soon after the committee
was formed, however, it learned that the city had already decided to raze the
waterfront structure. When they uncovered the secrecy of the city planning
process, the committee moved to "more urgently" study the best possible uses
of the area. 25
In light of these developments, the City Club committee's study was
broadened to include planning activities from the Ross Island to the Steel
bridges, between the river and Front Avenue. Its task was to review all plans
currently being considered and to evaluate the purposes to be served by
potential development. From its earliest discussions with city officials, the
committee believed that development of the downtown waterfront was being
designed to accommodate automobiles while little was planned for
pedestrians. As the City Club concluded, "inevitably there would be conflict
between the insatiable need to move automobiles and the development of the
waterfront in a manner which would enhance the quality of the downtown
area and the entire city." On September 6, the panel invited Lloyd Keefe, the
executive director of the planning commission, to discuss these problems.
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Keefe presented a concept for the waterfront development that seemed to
offer a solution to the committee's concerns. 26
Keefe's proposals coincided with the efforts of Oregon Governor Tom
McCall. When the Republican McCall was elected as the state's thirtieth
governor in 1966, few could have predicted the enormous impact he would
exert on public affairs. Fewer still could have foreseen his influence in
transforming the ten-lane Harbor Drive/Front Avenue highway into
Waterfront Park. Although he was born in Massachusetts, McCall grew up on
his family's ranch near Prineville. He attended the University of Oregon and
in 1944 enlisted in the Navy and served as a war correspondent in the Pacific.
Upon returning from the war, McCall turned his attention to politics. His first
major political employment was in 1949 as Governor Douglas McKay's
assistant. Yet McCall's early political career was marked by a series of defeats
including an unsuccessful congressional campaign in 1954 and not being
named state secretary of state by Governor Mark Hatfield in 1958.27
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Tom McCall's name recognition in the state did not come through
politics but rather through his work as a radio and television journalist. In
1962 while working for Portland's KGW-TV, McCall made the award-winning
documentary "Pollution in Paradise," a shocking expose on the pollution of
the Willamette River and an environmental call to arms. In "Pollution in
Paradise," McCall referred to the river as '"an open sewer"' and named the
names of some of the worst polluters. Many people credited McCall's
documentary with influencing a legislative bill in 1963 that, for the first time,
gave the state the power to shut down polluting companies. The next year,
Tom McCall reentered politics and scored his first victory by becoming
Oregon's secretary of state. Just two years later, McCall defeated Democratic
nominee Robert Straub to become govemor. 28
During his first term as governor, which began in 1967, Tom McCall
emerged as a powerful advocate for environmental issues. For example, he
provided unwavering support for a Willamette Greenway system. The idea
for a state-owned greenway running the entire 255-mile length of the
Willamette River had actually first been publicly proposed by Robert Straub
during the 1966 election campaign. While the project was altered to fit more
modest goals, McCall's support of the Greenway was critical to its success.
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Governor McCall also named himself to the State Sanitary Authority in order
to approve tougher air and water regulations. This legislation had a profound
effect on decreasing the pollution levels of the Willamette River. 29
One of Governor Tom McCall's greatest environmental
accomplishments was the 1967 Beach Bill, which expanded public ownership
of Oregon's more than 300-mile coastline up to the riparian line, thereby
ending the threat of private development on the beaches. Some of McCall's
other environmental accomplishments included the nation's first mandatory
bottle-deposit law, a bill that required the removal of billboards, the building
of bicycle paths using highway revenues, and creative energy conservation
measures during the energy crisis of the 1970s. Even with his notoriety as an
environmentalist, however, Tom McCall occasionally sided with economic
growth and industry. Two such examples were his support of the
development of nuclear power as well as his backing of high timber harvests. 30
McCall entered the fray over Portland's west side riverfront by
convening a joint session of the Portland City Council and the Multnomah
County Board of Commissioners in October 1968 to announce the creation of
the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development. The panel was
to contain three representatives each from the State of Oregon, Multnomah
County, and the City of Portland. Describing the meeting as one of the most
important in state history, McCall enthused, "The focus is intergovernmental
29
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coordination and cooperation at its zenith. The purpose is of transcendent
importance to each of our levels of government and to all our citizens."
McCall not only argued that Portland's riverfront area was the key to the
success of the Willamette Greenway system, but he challenged the task force
to find a way to beautify the downtown waterfront area. "We cannot afford to
spawn, through inattention and inaction, a sort of Berlin Wall of layer upon
layer of cement and high speed traffic which bar our citizens from what
should and must be one of the most attractive, livable and useful sections of
the core city," he declared. McCall pledged his personal support for the
project and instructed the State Highway Commission to find a way to make
the downtown riverfront area "highly accessible." 31
McCall chose "General" Glenn Jackson as chair of the task force. As the

Oregon Labor Press noted, it was widely acknowledged that, "no major
political, economic or governmental decisions are made in Oregon without
consulting Glenn Jackson." Not only was he the chair of the highway
commission, a position he held for seventeen years, he was also chair of the
Board of Pacific Power and Light, Co., the largest private electric utility in the
Northwest. Jackson also sat on the boards of numerous corporations and
organizations including Standard Insurance and the U.S. National Bank of
Oregon. Jackson had made his personal fortune by transforming Camp White,
an Army training center near Medford, into the White City industrial
City I County Coordinating Committee Meeting, "City I County Coordinating Committee
Meeting Minutes," 7 October 1968, Portland City Archives, 1-4; Abbott, Portland: Planning,
Politics, and Growth, 216; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384; Portland Parks and
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complex. Ironically, one of his notable business failures was his inability to
buy the Oregon Journal in 1961. State representatives on the task force also
included John Mosser, chair of the State Sanitary Authority, and Dennis
Lindsay, chair of the Port of Portland Commission.32
Task force participants from Portland and Multnomah County also
included powerful figures. Mayor Schrunk appointed Ira Keller; Herbert
Clark, president of Holman Transfer Company and chair of the planning
commission; and Commissioner Frank Ivancie. On the county level, task force
members included Clifford Alterman, chair of the Multnomah County
Planning Commission; C. Ralph Walstrom, president of Property Counselors,
Inc.; and Dr. John Phillips, vice-president of Lewis and Clark College.33
On November 8, Governor McCall presented a state sponsored plan for
the redevelopment of the downtown riverfront. It included "an underground
highway, a park-like setting, pedestrian access without difficulty, and an
unobstructed view of the Willamette River." The plan proposed the
elimination of both Harbor Drive and Front Avenue and in their place, the
construction of a depressed six-lane highway. The road would be placed
fourteen feet below ground level so as to provide an unobstructed view of the
32

'"General' Glenn Jackson, Most influential man in Oregon," Willamette Week, 14 April 1975,
1, 4, 8 (first quote, 1); "Power company head heads power structure," Oregon Labor Press, 5
December 1969, Glenn Jackson file, Oregon Historical Society, 20 (second quote); City Club of
Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront Development," 23;
Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics,
and Growth, 216; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul
Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40; Sam Galbreath to J. David
Hunt, 5May1977, 2, Bonner, personal files.
33
City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront
Development," 23; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384; Wolff Zimmer Gunsul
Frasca Partnership, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park," 40.

37

river from downtown. The highway also would be realigned away from the
Willamette River, which would require the demolition of a half block west of
Front Avenue to provide for a 250-foot wide, thirty acre green space on the
waterfront. In addition, at least four pedestrian bridges would be built to
access the riverfront park. The project was to require six to seven years to
complete with a cost of approximately $18 million. McCall argued that the
state's depressed roadway plan would cost approximately $25 million less
than the cut-and-cover plan. 34
Five days later, traffic engineer Fred Fowler sent a detailed report to
Commissioner lvanice attacking the state's depressed highway proposal.
Fowler argued that not only would valuable property west of S.W. Front
Avenue be destroyed because it fronted the proposed park area, but a
depressed and uncovered six-lane highway would cause enough noise and air
pollution to devalue real estate in the area. Furthermore, the plan would cause
serious local traffic problems. Fowler defended the cut-and-cover plan and
argued that it would not cost $25 million more than the state's depressed
highway plan; in fact, it might actually cost less. 35
Based on the traffic engineer's recommendations, the planning
commission in December 1968 published the "Downtown Waterfront Plan,"
which advocated the cut-and-cover plan as the best means to develop the
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downtown waterfront. The commission proposed to relocate Harbor Drive
immediately east of Front Avenue and tunnel the highway between Taylor
and Ash streets, a distance of 2,140 feet. This project, it argued, would allow
for a 235-foot wide waterfront park area between Front Avenue and the
Willamette River. Furthermore, the commission's plan permitted a future
extension of the tunnel section as far south as S.W. Market Street. The cost of
the project was placed at approximately $7 million, $11 million cheaper than
the state's plan. In addition, the commission argued, the noise and air
pollution caused by the tunneled highway would be greatly reduced. By
creating a vibrant area along the waterfront, city officials argued, the eastern
downtown area could be revived and strengthened. As the year 1968 came to
a close, the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development began
looking into the costs and feasibility of the city sponsored cut-and-cover
plan.36
In the period between 1960-1968, proponents of a waterfront park won
a series of victories. In the early 1960s, riverfront beautification advocates, led
by the Oregon Chapter of the American Institute of Architects and supported
by both the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, successfully stopped the
construction of the Ash Street ramp, which would not only have obstructed
the last open area along the riverfront, but would have eliminated the
opportunity to create a viable riverfront park in the foreseeable future. The
idea for a waterfront park was resurrected in 1968 when the city bought the
36 Portland City Planning Commission, "Downtown Waterfront Plan," December 1968,
Multnomah County Library, 1-4; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 215.
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...
old Journal building and planned to have it torn down. Sensing an opportunity
to beautify the riverfront, Governor Tom McCall, a long-time proponent of
environmental issues, created the Intergovernmental Task Force for
Waterfront Development, chaired by Glenn Jackson, to examine the issue and
make recommendations. By the end of 1968, it was clear that a park along the
river's edge was going to be built. The shape and size of the park, however,
along with the role automobiles would play in the area, was still to be
decided.

40

CHAPTER III
1969: THE DOWNTOWN WATERFRONT AND THE BATTLE OVER ITS
USES
While the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development
studied the conflicting state and city plans for the downtown west side
waterfront in the beginning of 1969, Portland officials went forward with
plans to demolish the old Journal Building. On April 9, the city council passed
Ordinance 128842, which sold the clock complex of the building to the Oregon
Museum of Science and Industry (OMSI). A few weeks later, the city
contracted the Atlas Building Wreckers and Terminal Transfer Company for
$155,400. While the original plan between the city and state was to evenly split
the costs of the demolition, $64,575 each, Portland paid an extra $26,250 to
have part of the rubble transported and used as landfill at Powers Marine
Park, located on the Willamette River's west bank near the Sell wood Bridge.
The city had originally budgeted $150,000 to pay its share of the costs. The
demolition project was scheduled to begin on May 1 and was projected to take
sixty days to complete. 1
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The city's plans were temporarily complicated in May when
controversial businessperson Stan Terry informed the city council that he
would seek a restraining order in circuit court if the demolition of the old

Journal Building went forward. Terry argued that the building should be
utilized to relieve the crowded traffic court and help solve the downtown
parking problem. Specifically, he envisioned using the first floor of the
waterfront structure for a traffic court and other municipal functions. The
second and third floors, suggested Terry, would be utilized as a parking
facility to return needed revenue to the city's coffers. In late June, Stan Terry's
plan suffered a setback as his suit was thrown out of court on the grounds that
it was a "sham and frivolous." On July l, the Atlas Building Wreckers began
their work on the building. 2
The next day at the city council, Stan Terry declared that he wanted to
enter into negotiations to purchase the old Journal Building. Terry argued that
tearing down the building to expand Harbor Drive was a waste of money
because the recently completed Stadium Freeway had alleviated much of the
traffic on the riverfront highway. He also insisted that the soon-to-be
completed Fremont Bridge would further make Harbor Drive obsolete. Mayor
Terry Shrunk responded that not only was it impossible for the council to sell
2
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the building, because it was jointly owned by the city and the State Highway
Department, but the demolition had already damaged the structure beyond
repair. Commissioner Frank Ivancie not only questioned Terry's knowledge of
traffic volume on Harbor Drive but cut off his statement by declaring, "your
two minutes are up, Stan." "It's always nice to know," Terry responded,
"every time you try to do something to benefit the community, some wiseacre
always wants to make fun of you." Terry closed the debate by arguing that
city officials had .been too secretive regarding plans to demolish the building
and that proper community discussion had not taken place. 3
On May 28, the City Club's Committee on the Journal Building Site and
Willamette Riverfront Development met to discuss the progress being made
by the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront Development. Committee
member Morton Spence, who was a journalist for the Oregon Journal, notified
the panel that on May 21, Governor Tom McCall had proposed to the task
force and highway department that Harbor Drive be abandoned. McCall also
suggested that rerouting the traffic from the riverfront highway could be done
without much difficulty. The governor had argued that the elimination of
Harbor Drive was the best plan not only to realize the full potential for the
waterfront park, but also to avoid the high costs of the cut-and-cover and
depressed highway plans. Spence reported that the highway department had
"reluctantly" accepted the governor's proposal. "The fly in the ointment is
City Hall," Spence declared, "The Traffic Bureau is adamant that Harbor

3
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Drive is essential to handle truck traffic. They turned thumbs down on the
whole idea." Despite such objections, the committee agreed that the
elimination of Harbor Drive constituted a viable plan and that it should be
examined in their "interim report," which they planned to complete by that
fall. "I believe we may still be able to wield some influence in the decisionmaking process," Spence stated at the close of the meeting.4
The City Club's belief that Portland officials were adamantly opposed
to Governor McCall's plan to eliminate Harbor Drive is confirmed in a June 4
letter to the City Bureau of Traffic Engineering from traffic engineer D.E.
Bergstrom. Bergstrom argued that while existing Harbor Drive traffic could be
accommodated with the elimination of the highway by rerouting vehicles via
S.W. First and Second avenues, 1990 traffic projections showed that this would
cause serious future congestion problems. "All of these problems will be
created and the only resulting benefit is an additional 44' width in the
greenway area between the river and Harbor Drive," Bergstrom insisted. "In
my opinion the plan is not workable." The traffic engineer further
recommended to Commissioner lvancie that he not consider McCall's plan as
a viable solution. 5
On July 3, the City Club learned that Commissioner lvancie was

planning to make a statement four days later regarding the adoption of a
proposal to develop the downtown waterfront. lvancie's proposal called for
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moving Harbor Drive west adjacent to Front Avenue and widening the
highway to six lanes. This would have created a 150-foot wide highway with
ten lanes of fast moving traffic, leaving 138-feet to be landscaped for a park,
accessible only by two pedestrian bridges. Throughout his political career,
lvancie placed great importance on the role automobiles played in society.
"Next to one's home," he once stated, "an automobile is the most cherished
possession because it is tangible proof of the freedom in a free society." 6
Members of the City Club's committee, most notably Chair David J.
Lewis and Morton Spence, swung into action to try to stop the plan. Spence
immediately contacted Glenn Jackson, chair of the task force and the State
Highway Commission, to confirm the news. Jackson responded that in fact
lvancie was preparing to announce the adoption of the ten-lane highway
system but that such action did not destroy the possibility of the waterfront
park being built in the next fifteen to twenty years. The committee then called
Ed Westerdahl, the governor's administrative assistant, who declared that at
the last task force meeting McCall had negotiated a compromise plan in which
he accepted the cut-and-cover idea. Governor McCall, however, had not
signed off on the "lvancie plan." 7
6
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The committee next telephoned John Fulton, the head of the recently
created State Department of Transportation, and declared that it felt strongly
that no decision on the issue should be made until public hearings were held.
At the conclusion of the call, Fulton not only assured the panel that the
proposed announcement would not be made on July 7, but urged the City
Club to not "take precipitate action on this matter." Fulton refused, however,
to commit to public hearings before a decision was made on developing the
downtown waterfront. During the weekend of July 5 and 6, Lewis and Spence
drafted a three-page statement, which they proposed to release to the press if
Commissioner Ivancie in fact made the announcement on the seventh. Their
statement declared the City Club's opposition to the "bilateral decision of
Highway Commission Chairman Jackson and Commissioner Ivancie, with no
effort being made to have public hearings." On Monday afternoon, the City
Club Board of Governors voted five to three to adopt Lewis and Morton's
statement. The committee also vowed to accelerate completion of their interim
report for best possible uses of the riverfront as "an anti-Ivancie missile." 8
Later that afternoon, Commissioner Ivancie held a press conference and
declared that a decision on the development of the downtown waterfront
would be made in the near future. He emphasized that any decision made by
local officials would also have to be approved by the highway commission.
Ivancie stated that task force members were considering three alternatives for
Building Site Use and Riverfront Development," Portland City Club Bulletin 50, 8 August, 1969,
25; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 384.
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f

improving traffic conditions and scenery in the area; none of them included
Governor McCall's call for the removal of Harbor Drive. These strategies
included the cut-and-cover idea, the Ivancie plan, and the proposal to widen
Harbor Drive. The City Club's committee now decided not to release its press
statement to the news media. 9
In response to the uproar concerning Commissioner Ivancie's canceled
announcement, Governor McCall sent a letter on July 15 to Glenn Jackson
requesting "maximum clarification" of the goals for the task force. McCall
stated that, assuming the cut-and-cover plan was too expensive, the minimum
criteria for the waterfront area were creating a strip of highway no wider than
100-feet to handle all traffic needs, moving the highway closer to Front
Avenue to ensure a green space of at least 180-feet in width, depressing the
roadway so as to eliminate automobile noise, and encouraging private
industries to build over the roadway so as to integrate downtown with the
park area. McCall insisted that his goals for the area went beyond simply
moving traffic. Furthermore, he instructed Jackson to look into the
redevelopment of the west side waterfront area between the Hawthorne and
Ross Island bridges so as to "truly enhance" the entire riverfront. The
governor also suggested that a decision on the development of the area be
made "in an extremely timely fashion." "You have a tremendous amount of
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talent on your task force," McCall declared, "and I am sure that solutions can
be achieved on each of these points in the early future." 10
One month after David J. Lewis and Morton Spence had caused the
cancellation of Commissioner Ivancie's announcement regarding the
development of the riverfront, the City Club's Board of Governors voted
overwhelmingly on August 8 in support of the Committee on the Journal
Building Site and Willamette Riverfront Development's "Interim Report." The
panel argued that there was an urgent need for the report, due to the secrecy
of members of the task force, particularly Ivancie and Jackson. They also
declared that one of their concerns was whether a decision for the downtown
waterfront had already been made and the announcement of such a policy
only awaited the arrival of supporting material. This concern, insisted the
committee, was reinforced when it learned that an independent firm had been
hired to develop a plan for a 135-foot wide green space along the riverfront as
well as a widened Harbor Drive. Since the task force appeared to be
considering only one plan, they stated, "other proposals which might be of
more long range value to the community" were not receiving "equal
consideration." 11
In its report, the City Club committee declared that the goal of
waterfront development should be to improve the life of the city through the
use of diverse features. To simply better facilitate traffic flows, they argued,
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would not satisfy these goals. Utilizing Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great

American Cities, which argued that a good city required a "diversity" of uses to
create a feeling of community, the panel outlined the basic criteria, which it
believed essential to any waterfront plan. These included the varied use of
land so as to encourage community activities throughout the year, an
environment that was aesthetically pleasing, an area highly accessible to
pedestrians, and easy and attractive access to the river. The City Club leaders
further criticized the task force for not linking the development of the
waterfront with that of the downtown area as a whole. 12
In its assessment of the task force, the City Club said that it had
"serious doubts about the adequacy of present planning efforts." It declared
that each of the five waterfront plans-the depressed highway idea
announced by Governor McCall in November 1968, the planning
commission's "Downtown Waterfront Plan" of December 1968, the Ivancie
plan, the abandonment of Harbor Drive idea, and the interim plan to
temporarily widen Harbor Drive and plan for the riverfront park-lacked
"human values." Only the "Downtown Waterfront Plan," declared the
committee, had treated the green space as anything more than "simply the
space that is left over after the highway is taken care of, and even in the
Planning Commission's proposal it is shown only as a concept and not as a
plan." Furthermore, when the highway department deemed the cut-and-cover
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and depressed highway plans too expensive, it argued, "there is no evidence
that it has weighed that cost against the value to the downtown properties and
shops, or against the pride and pleasure which a well-conceived plan could
afford all Portlanders." The committee lambasted the secrecy of the task force,
stating that, since its creation by the governor in November 1968, it had had
only three meetings with no agendas and no minutes. 13
The City Club committee particularly criticized city officials for lack of
leadership in the planning process. It argued that it was pivotal that city hall
mobilize the people, with the cooperation of both public and private interests,
to develop a grand plan not only for the development of the waterfront, but
also for downtown as a whole. Without this dialogue, the committee insisted,
Portlanders would not know the choices and alternatives involved. Time was
running out, it declared, and very possibly a decision on the waterfront
development would be made without public participation, leaving the people
to pay the bill for a green space that would "be little used and contribute
nothing to the central city's vitality." The committee warned Portlanders not
to forget the lack of public discussion in the purchase of the old Journal
Building and the decision to raze it. Its report concluded by recommending
that no decision on the area be made "until adequate studies of alternatives
have been completed and public hearings held." Furthermore, the committee
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City Club of Portland, "Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront
Development," 29-31.

50

argued, the task force should utilize the expertise of the planning commission
to come up with creative plans to satisfy the "city's needs and capabilities." 14
The next day, Commissioner Frank Ivancie responded to the City
Club's "Interim Report" by describing it as "a complete falsehood." The
commissioner denied reports that he had been set to announce on July 7 the
task force's adoption of the plan to widen Harbor Drive and leave only 135feet of green space. "How can the City Club be of service to this community,"
insisted Ivancie, "when they don't want to stick with the facts?" Portland
Planning Director Lloyd Keefe also objected to the committee's report. Keefe
particularly objected to the City Club's critique of the city council and
planning commission. He argued that the report contained numerous
incorrect "inferences and statements." Keefe insisted, furthermore, that the
planning commission had been working hard to develop the waterfront since
the early 1960s. 15

14
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Two weeks later, on August 21, David J. Lewis and Neil Goldschmidt,
while addressing the biweekly meeting of the Portland Art Commission,
argued that the task force should not make any quick decisions regarding the
development of the downtown waterfront. The two insisted that what was
needed was a comprehensive study by "professionals" to create an overall
plan for how the riverfront development related to the entire downtown area.
The task force, argued Goldschmidt, was primarily concerned with traffic
flows and not with creating a viable green space along the waterfront. Both
Lewis and Goldschmidt emphasized that if not planned properly, a riverfront
park would not be attractive to people. 16
Just as it had sided with opponents of the Ash Street ramp debate in
1961, the Oregonian now supported efforts to beautify the riverfront. In its
editorial "No Berlin Wall Here," the daily argued that the City Club's "Interim
Report" had "performed a valuable service in focusing public attention on
prospective development of the waterfront." Even though some local officials
had challenged statements in the report, the editors insisted, the "official
silence" of the task force seemed to confirm that a decision to build ten lanes
of traffic had already been made. Without a statement from the task force, the

Oregonian argued, the alarm caused by the City Club's report would quickly
spread. Whatever decision was made to temporarily re-route traffic after the
old Journal Building was razed, the newspaper argued, it should not bar longplace. At the City Club's Board of Governors meeting on August 11, it was agreed that a letter
be sent to Ivancie informing him of certain erroneous statements, including the
commissioner's claim of never having "knowingly" met with the committee. City Club of
Portland, Board of Governors meeting, Minutes, 11 August 1969, Bonner, personal files.
16
"City Club Urges Brakes on Waterfront," The Oregonian, 21August1969, sec. 2, p. 21.

52

range plans for a "highly accessible" waterfront park. In its August 22
editorial "Let's Not Be Hasty," the Oregonian reminded its readers that only
the "loud disapproval" of a large number of Portlanders had halted the
building of the proposed Ash Street ramp. The daily argued, furthermore, that
the Fremont Bridge, when completed, might channel enough traffic off Harbor
Drive to make its widening irrelevant. The Oregonian further insisted that only
after a specific plan garnered public approval should steps be made to
develop the waterfront. 17
Further criticism of task force members surfaced with staff writer
William Sanderson's August 17 editorial, "Harbor Drive Holds Key to
Waterfront Devel?pment." Sanderson declared that the moment had come for
Portland to finally salvage "the city's richest aesthetic resource" after it had
been forfeited in the name of commerce and traffic movement. He also wrote,
however, that he doubted whether the city council or the highway department
were willing to approve a plan to beautify the waterfront. Of the five
proposals, Sanderson advocated the abandonment of Harbor Drive. He cited
task force member John Mosser as stating that it "is the only plan that makes
sense." Sanderson further quoted Mosser as arguing that the decision for the
development was a political one and that "automobiles will go anywhere we
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make a place for them. I don't think the waterfront is the place for
automobiles." 18
Sanderson explained, however, that the majority of task force members,
most notably Frank Ivancie and Glenn Jackson, disagreed with Mosser's
assessment. Mosser' s plan is "very noble," Sanderson quoted lvancie as
stating, "but it doesn't face the practical problems of traffic problems." Both
Jackson and lvancie argued that they had in fact not agreed to an "interim
plan," which would have widened Harbor Drive, slightly depressed the
highway, and included plans to build a park at a future date, but that at the
moment it made the most sense and would be the first step in implementing
the costly cut-and-cover tunnel. Sanderson concluded that the task force's
interim plan went against Governor McCall's plea to not build a "Berlin Wall"
around the waterfront. 19
The City Club's report, together with the Oregonian's editorials, caused
a flood of letters to the newspaper, starting in mid-August, which supported
the case against the task force. In a letter entitled "Let's Slow Down," one
correspondent wrote that, "It saddens me to observe that we are so
automobile-oriented we often forget the pedestrian." The writer urged the
task force to take advantage of the beauty of the Willamette River in assessing
future development plans. She insisted that some of the charm of European
cities was the pedestrian focus as well as the utilization of its riverfronts.

18

William Sanderson, "Harbor Drive Holds Key to Waterfront Development," The Oregonian,
17 August 1969, forum section, p. 3.
19 Jbid.

54

Portlanders needed to stop the task force from ruining the waterfront and
selling out the city to "gas-eating monsters." 20
On August 18, Governor McCall met privately with Mayor Shrunk,
Commissioner lvancie, Glenn Jackson, and Multnomah County and state
planners and engineers to discuss the status of the plans to develop the
downtown waterfront. McCall now announced that he had instructed the task
force to hold public hearings at the earliest possible date. Three of the five
development plans (the cut-and-cover idea, the lvancie Plan, and the interim
plan) were "still in the ballpark." McCall declared, however, that the task
force would welcome ideas from the public at the hearing. He also stated that
those present at the meeting favored the cut-and-cover plan but recognized
that it would be costly. Highway engineer Forrest Cooper stated that the task
force had "virtually ruled out" the plan to abandon Harbor Drive because
1990 traffic projections showed 90,000 vehicles utilizing the highway daily.
The governor also announced that he would soon appoint a seven-member
committee to study plans for a future public transportation system in the
Portland metropolitan area in accordance with legislation passed in the
Oregon legislature at the city's request. 21
Even though beautification advocates undoubtedly were relieved to
hear that public hearings would take place, some were angered by the task
force's refusal to consider the abandonment of Harbor Drive. In a letter to the
Barbara J. Bell, "Let's Slow Down," The Oregonian, 13 August 1969, 26.
"McCall Calls For Quick Hearings on Willamette Bank Beautification," The Oregonian, 19
August 1969, sec. 2, p. 10 (first quote); "Greenway Hearing Date Due," The Oregon Journal, 19
August 1969, 2.
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editor in the Oregonian on August 28, one Portlander argued that to abandon
the idea to eliminate Harbor Drive based on 1990 traffic projections was
absurd. "Too often, and for too long," he insisted, "development in this
community has been largely a response to a trend or to a one-sided projection
of a trend." The correspondent also stated that the abandonment of Harbor
Drive was the only logical choice if a significant waterfront park was to be
built. At the very least, he argued, per the City Club's warnings, no decision
should be made before full consideration of all alternatives had been
discussed publicly. "Isn't it about time we start to decide the future of our
city," the reader asked, "on the basis of what we want it to be like in 1990?" 22
On August 19, 250 adults and 100 children showed up for a picnic on

the small grass area between the traffic lanes of Harbor Drive north of the old

Journal Building. People held banners that read "Parks for People" and "Save
Our Riverfront," while children between the ages of eighteen months and two
years were tethered together with a rope so that they did not wander into the
traffic. The picnic was a major media event. The Riverfront for People
Committee, who had sponsored the picnic, demanded a viable waterfront
park with easy pedestrian access and varied activities and development
priorities that placed people ahead of cars and emphasized citizen
participation through public hearings in the decision making process.
Furthermore, the group vehemently opposed all efforts to widen Harbor
Drive, which they believed the highway commission had already decided to
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do. "We want to show what a great opportunity Portland has in its
riverfront," explained Robert Belcher, chair of the committee. "The whole city
has been alienated from the riverfront," fellow committee member Victor
Erickson added, "When I worked downtown, it would have been good to
lunch along the river if there hadn't been the need to cross eight lanes of death
and destruction." 23
Working together with fellow architect Jim Howell, Robert and Allison
Belcher had formed the Riverfront for People Committee in response to the
warnings outlined in the City Club's "Interim Report." The organization was
made up mainly of young architects and city planners and their spouses. The
Belchers had previously been involved in protests against the U.S. war in
Vietnam and other "adventures fighting the establishment." They had
traveled extensively in Europe and witnessed how beautiful cities utilized
their waterfronts. In early August, Allison Belcher had been listening to a
radio discussion of the recently published City Club report. "The state and
local officials felt it was a splendid opportunity to expand the riverfront road
system," she later explained. "I told my husband and Jim Howell: what are
you big shot architects going to do about this?" Later in August, Allison
Belcher attempted to speak to task force member Ira Keller about the plans to
23
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widen Harbor Drive. "He told me I was just a housewife," Mrs. Belcher said,
"That's why I decided I had to do something." 24
Prior to the picnic at the old Journal Building, Robert and Allison
Belcher had spent the month of August engaging in an aggressive organizing
and letter-writing campaign demanding public hearings and better leadership
from elected officials regarding plans for the development of the riverfront.
Their campaign included letters to Governor McCall, State Treasurer Robert
Straub, and Commissioner Ivancie as well as letters-to-the-editor in both the

Oregonian and the Oregon Journal. In his letter to Straub, Robert Belcher argued
that there was a crisis with regard to the waterfront "stemming from
inadequate leadership, over zealous highway pressure, and unrealistic
planning." Bob Belcher demanded public hearings as well as "public
commitment" from the city, county, and state levels supporting "an exciting
and pedestrian oriented riverfront development program." Responding to
Allison Belcher' s letter, Governor McCall reiterated that, with regard to
beautifying the downtown waterfront, "we are not going to miss this
opportunity." The governor insisted that all the agencies working on the issue
were committed "to work with the people in arriving at the best possible
development plan." 25
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On Tuesday, September 17, the Riverfront for People Committee

sponsored a second "bring your own bag" public picnic just north of the old
Journal Building. Some 150 people attended despite fall showers. The picnic

featured a fireboat water display by the Portland Fire Bureau and a calliope
concert. Like the first picnic in August, the second protest was a media event.
During his presentation to the crowd, Robert Belcher called for a
comprehensive study of the riverfront development, along with regular public
hearings before a final decision was made. Belcher declared that not only had
many past city planning decisions been made by governmental officials who
were isolated from citizens, but that the public needed to rally in favor of a
significant waterfront park so as not to "stagnate the city with freeways on
both sides of the river." 26
Using the picnic as an organizing tool, the Riverfront for People
Committee solicited support for a petition for a downtown waterfront
program. It proclaimed support for efforts "to reclaim the west bank of the
Willamette River and to realize maximum beauty and growth for Portland
through a farsighted riverfront program." The committee proposed a program
that included creating a pedestrian friendly riverfront park to stimulate
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downtown growth to "provide Portland with pride." Riverfront development
should have the "priorities of people first, car traffic second," it suggested.
Meanwhile, committee member Jim Howell unveiled his architectural plans
for what the waterfront could become. Howell proposed to tunnel Harbor
Drive and develop the riverfront with attractions including restaurants, water
gardens, picnic areas, a festival park, a marine museum, offices, and
apartment buildings. Howell warned that temporary measures "tended to
become permanent." Although tunneling and developing the waterfront
would be expensive, he concluded, in the long run such a proposal would
prove to be the most economical approach. 27
The day following the second picnic, Robert Belcher's editorial "Let's
Reclaim Our River," was published in the Clarke Press, a weekly Portland
publication. "What we need is a riverfront for people," insisted Belcher, "and
the establishment of a great city park." He not only labeled the Ivancie plan
"disastrous," but seriously questioned the use of 1990 projected traffic trends
as the sole evidence on which to base waterfront development decisions.
"What is clear," argued Belcher, "is that there has been no imagination, no
sensitivity to human and urban values and necessities, and no will power
either at the city, the county, or the state level to bring citizens and consultants
into the picture." He further declared that he was shocked that the cut-andcover tunnel plan, which he believed was a viable development idea, was
27

"A Petition by the Riverfront for People Committee for a West Bank Riverfront Program,"
16 September 1969, Belcher's personal files (first, second, and third quotes); "Campaign Opens
for Downtown Riverfront Park," The Oregon Journal, 17 September 1969, 2 (fourth quote);
Robert Belcher interview; Jim Howell interview.

60

r
,

(<

;.r

being met with "silence by City Hall." Belcher demanded public hearings, the
creation of a Portland Citizens Task Force and a thorough professional study
of the area to be completed by July 1970. "The will of the people is essential to
significant improvement in Portland," Belcher declared. 28
While Allison Belcher rallied the "average person" with the petition
drive, Robert Belcher successfully brought the "power echelon" of Portland to
the cause. On September 17, the Portland Art Commission adopted a
statement to Mayor Terry Schrunk and the city commissioners that declared
its support of the goals of the Riverfront for People Committee. Specifically,
the art commission argued against utilizing the downtown waterfront as a
traffic expressway and instead proposed the building of a riverfront park that
would include both "places for quiet reflection" and areas for "interesting and
exciting activities throughout the year." The future growth of Portland, the
commission declared, depended on how public and private developments
were "oriented to people." 29
As it had done during the Ash Street ramp debate in 1961, the local
chapter of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) defended the
beautification of the waterfront area. In the days following the second picnic,
AIA members contacted Oregon's garden clubs to induce them to join the
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fight. "I recall that the help and backing of the Garden Clubs," stated AIA
member Richard Norman, "helped to defeat the' Ash Street Overpass."' The
AIA also brought renowned urban affairs analyst Alan Temko to speak in
Portland on September 19. "What God gave Portland," Temko declared,
"Mankind has done its best to destroy." The speaker charged the members of
the AIA with taking the lead in protecting the beautiful resources of the
Northwest, including the riverfront. "You cannot half-rape the Portland
waterfront," Temko insisted. "You just can't let those fiends put in an 8-laner
next to the river." Temko's statements were publicized in both the Oregonian
and the Oregon Journal on September 20. 30
The AIA also initiated a letter-writing campaign to elected officials,
which called for public hearings and the rejection of expedient solutions. In
his response, Governor McCall assured the architects that, "I share your views
completely." Task force member Ira Keller's reaction, however, was not as
cordial. "It would be refreshing to see you go out and get something done,"
insisted Keller, "rather than simply to object to a plan offering considerable
improvement within the funds which we have available." The AIA responded
that it did not know what "plan" Keller was referring to. Since there had been
no public hearings, it argued, "how can we object to a plan we have not seen?"
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The institute reiterated that it would "settle for nothing less" than the
beautification of the riverfront. 31
While the Oregon Journal had supported the opponents of the Ash Street
ramp in 1961, the daily newspaper had a lukewarm response to advocates of
waterfront beautification in 1969. In its September 19 editorial entitled "Good
Ideas Cost Money," the Journal argued that while the Riverfront for People
Committee's proposals were noble, the cut-and-cover project was too costly
and the elimination of Harbor Drive was unrealistic. Instead, citizens groups
needed to figure out a way to put the city on "better financial footing." On
September 20, the Journal's Jack Ostergren published a column advocating the
Ivancie plan. Ostergren argued that not only was the cost of the project
realistic, but traffic needs could still be met while allowing the creation of a
waterfront park. Ostergren' s piece received several angry responses, including
one from AIA member and city preservationist Alfred Staehli, who argued
that it was merely "a shameless attempt to build support for the State
Highway Commission plan for another highway widening project." 32
On October 3, eleven days before the announced task force public
hearing, Ira Keller declared that Portland voters might be asked to approve a
31
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$10-12 million bond issue in the May 1970 primary election to finance the
redevelopment of the downtown waterfront. Keller estimated the cost of the
cut-and-cover tunnel plan to be close to $15 million. While state and federal
aid would provide $3 to $5 million, Portlanders would have to come up with
the remainder of the funds. Keller's announcement was a surprise, as it
appeared likely that the task force was close to approving the interim plan.
The members of the Riverfront for People Committee immediately criticized
Keller. His announcement, Robert Belcher argued, was "a politically inspired
move to keep the reins in his own hands." Keller's "premature" statements,
said the committee, were designed to scare taxpaying voters into allowing the
task force to choose the cheaper interim or Ivancie plans. His announcement,
charged Belcher, typified "a serious lack of communication between the
community and officialdom." 33
On October 8, Multnomah County Commissioner David Eccles,

speaking at a joint city-county coordinating committee meeting, argued that a
proposal to build a downtown Portland civic center should have priority over
the development of the riverfront. Eccles stated that because of the costs of
both projects (the civic center plan was estimated to cost $35 million), both
could not be built. In its editorial "Let's Look to Priorities" published the next
day, the Oregon Journal insisted that Portlanders needed to determine what
projects were the most needed for the area. The daily newspaper argued that
33
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while all pending civic projects were justifiable, given the present tax load, all
could not be paid for. The Journal warned against taking a "piecemeal look at
local needs" and acting on projects being pushed by a particular group, such
as the Riverfront for People Committee. 34
In the weeks prior to the task force's public hearing, Riverfront for
People not only increased pressure on elected officials to support the
beautification of the downtown waterfront, but also utilized the two daily
newspapers to get their message out. In late September, City Club member
Neil Goldschmidt set up an appointment for Robert Belcher to meet with State
Treasurer Robert Straub. As a result, Straub supported the committee's
riverfront plans and set up an appointment for Belcher to meet with Glenn
Jackson. Jackson now "gave a sympathetic ear" to the Riverfront Committee's
cause and recommended that they should use the coming hearing to
emphasize relevant environmental factors, which he described as "a strong
argument." If the money were available, Jackson promised, he would not
hesitate to support the cut-and-cover tunnel plan. 35

On October 8, Neil Goldschmidt and Robert Belcher spoke at Portland
State University and argued that a decision on the waterfront should be
delayed until a comprehensive study of the entire downtown could be
completed. Goldschmidt criticized the city council for not considering the
downtown area as a whole when studying solutions for riverfront
34
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development. The future city commissioner and mayor argued in favor of
planning for mass transit, development of the downtown business section,
and abatement of water and air pollution. Robert Belcher declared that the
cost estimates of the various development proposals were "highly unreliable."
Belcher also advocated the abandonment of Harbor Drive as a means to
develop a viable waterfront park while avoiding the high costs of the cut-andcover tunnel plan. On October 13, the day before the task force's public
hearing, Riverfront for People member Earl Johnson published an illustration
in the Oregon Journal sponsored by the fictitious "Riverfront for Cars
Committee." Johnson's parody showed the downtown waterfront packed
with twelve-lanes of grid-locked traffic with no green space lining the harbor
wall. The illustration was combined with an appeal for people to show up at
the public hearing.36
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On the morning of October 14, with the task force's hearing just hours
away, waterfront beautification advocates received the good news that U. S.
Senator Robert Packwood publicly supported their cause. "I am in full
support of the efforts and concepts of the 'Riverfront for People' Committee,"
insisted Packwood, "for the beautification of the Harbor Drive area." The
senator agreed with the activists that a comprehensive study of the riverfront
should be initiated. The waterfront, declared Packwood, should be a place
"where all may enjoy it." Earlier, on September 6, Oregon's junior senator had
championed the cause to save the state's natural environment from further
erosion and pollution by indicating that he would break ranks with past
Oregon members of Congress and vote for conservation measures even if they
impeded economic growth. 37
At the public hearing at Portland's City Hall on October 14, attended by
over 500 people including fifty-two organizations brought in by the Riverfront
for People Committee, the task force received a "rather loud and clear
message": move slowly and include more people. Throughout the hearing,
task force members insisted that they did not favor one plan over another. The
prior week, however, one member had leaked to the press that the committee
was prepared to propose the cut-and-cover plan over the interim plan. To
counteract the proposed action, Robert Belcher submitted petitions with about
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2,500 signatures and argued that riverfront planning should be extended to
include the Skidmore District, located near the Burnside Bridge. Architect
John Broome reminded the task force of the "multimillion-dollar blunder" that
was the proposed Ash Street ramp and argued "another such blunder may be
in the making." AIA President Richard Norman, meanwhile, repeated the
position that to dismiss the idea to eliminate Harbor Drive based on 1990
traffic estimates was absurd. Norman said that the projections did not
consider new traffic signalization systems due to be implemented in 1970 nor
the advent of a mass transit system. 38
On October 23, Governor Tom McCall, responding to the public

hearing, sent a letter to Glenn Jackson detailing the future plans of the task
force. McCall recommended implementing many of the points the Riverfront
for People Committee had proposed. The governor argued that a
comprehensive plan for the waterfront area that looked not only at traffic
flows but at the entire environment would be undertaken. McCall stated that
the standards for the study were expressed in the goals of the Portland
Planning Commission's "Downtown Waterfront Plan," including the need "to
create an inviting, human space" that capitalized "on the natural asset we
have in the Willamette River," using the green space to renew the area around
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Front Avenue, strengthening the downtown against "continuing
decentralization forces," improving Portland's image, and providing an
adequate space for the annual Rose Festival. McCall urged the creation of a
citizen advisory committee and the hiring of independent professional
planners to develop "the most appropriate program for the core area." 39
Governor McCall also requested that Glenn Jackson pledge $20,000 or
40 percent of the total costs, whichever was greater, from the highway
commission to assist in financing the planning for the waterfront. He then
argued that due to the testimony given at the public hearing, the stretch of
land being considered for redevelopment should be expanded to include the
entire area between the Steel and Ross Island bridges and at least up to First
A venue. The governor insisted that the state take the lead in providing
financial assistance to the project. Accordingly, McCall asked Jackson to
pledge $7 million in highway funds towards the completion of the project. He
argued that any financial investment in the development of the waterfront
would be "totally self-supporting under a program which would reflect
sharply increased land values." "Please regard this letter," McCall insisted,
"as further evidence of my commitment to the consummation of a project that
is without rival in its potential favorable impact on the image of all of
Oregon." 40
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On November 4, Glenn Jackson publicly announced Governor Tom

McCall's changes. Jackson added that the waterfront park would "bring the
activities of the city down to the water" and include commercial and
recreational uses. McCall's plan was, however, not without controversy. As
the Oregon Journal pointed out in its November 5 editorial, "As Others See the
Waterfront," some Oregonians outside of Portland resented the waterfront
being given such a high priority. For example, while N.W. Barmeir, chair of
the Columbia County Board of Commissioners, believed that the
improvement of the Lower Columbia River Highway should have priority
over Portland's riverfront park, Andy Nasburg, chair of the Coos Bay
Planning Commission, argued that widening Ocean Boulevard in Coos Bay
should be considered first. Glenn Jackson defended the state's decision by
insisting that most of the development of the downtown waterfront would
have to be paid for by private businesses and local taxpayers. On the other
hand, in its November 5 editorial "Riverfront Sights Rise," the Oregonian
argued that a world-class riverfront park in Portland would "serve the city
and state as a system of Oregon's natural endowments." 41
On December 19, the Harbor Drive Parkway Task Force met for the first

time at city hall with the newly created eighteen-member citizens advisory
committee. The task force and advisory committee now voted to hire the firm
of DeLeuw, Cather & Company of San Francisco to study the best uses of the
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downtown waterfront. Cost of the study was expected to be $75,000. The
decision to hire DeLeuw, Cather was made by task force member John Mosser
who was seeking to ensure the firm looked beyond traffic considerations in
developing a plan. DeLeuw, Cather had previously been hired by the
Columbia Region Association of Governments to conduct a metropolitan mass
transit study. It was also announced that the wider project could include
staffing and administrative fees of as much as $200,000 for the first year, with
part of the cost being paid for with federal funds. 42
As the year 1969 came to a close, the old Journal Building had still not
been completely demolished. On December 9, Walter Lowe, the owner of
Atlas Building Wreckers, stated that the city had denied his request that
Harbor Drive be closed from 6 a.m. to 3 p.m. so that demolition of the
building's east wall could be completed. City officials had said that holiday
traffic was too heavy to close the highway. Traffic engineers estimated that a
thousand vehicles per hour utilized the highway during those times. Starting
December 10, Atlas had to pay a $100 per day penalty for not having
completed the demolition in the agreed number of days. The city finally
agreed to close Harbor Drive between 7 p.m. and 11 p.m., when 500 vehicles
used the highway hourly, but only after January l.43
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1969 was a critical year in planning for the development of the
downtown waterfront. In July, the City Club's Committee on the Journal
Building Site and Willamette Riverfront Development criticized the unilateral
decision making process of the task force, most notably Commissioner Frank
Ivancie and State Highway Commission Chair Glenn Jackson, and
successfully blocked the implementation of the Ivancie Plan. In its "Interim
Report" published the following month, the City Club argued not only should
waterfront development be linked to the downtown area, but that public
hearings should be held so that more voices could influence the plan for the
area. Inspired by the report, Robert and Allison Belcher, along with Jim
Howell, formed the Riverfront for People Committee. Their efforts, which
included two highly publicized picnics at the old Journal Building, galvanized
waterfront beautification advocates. Governor Tom McCall, responding to the
October 14 public hearing in which the task force was lambasted for its
secrecy, instructed Glenn Jackson to implement many of the Riverfront for
People Committee's recommendations. As the 1960s ended, proponents of a
viable riverfront park had made enormous strides but a definitive plan for the
area had not yet been chosen.
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CHAPTERN
PLANNING THE CLOSURE OF HARBOR DRNE
On February 3, 1970, the State Highway Commission approved an
earlier agreement by the Intergovernmental Task Force for Waterfront
Development and its own advisory committee to hire DeLeuw, Cather, a San
Francisco traffic engineering firm, to study the possibility of removing Harbor
Drive. Commission Chair Glenn Jackson indicated that the study would
determine the amount of land available for possible riverfront development
and would provide "for a more realistic approach to the river frontage
planning problem." 1
Five months later, on July 9, the highway commission, the Portland
City Council, and a group of downtown businesspeople held a joint meeting
to announce the proposed closure of Harbor Drive once the Fremont Bridge
was completed at the end of 1971. Jackson declared that the nearly completed
Stadium Freeway, along with the Fremont Bridge, had altered downtown
traffic, making the waterfront highway unnecessary. "We finally decided on
elimination," he stated at the meeting, "because it would be impossible to
keep it and satisfy everyone on a riverfront land bank for people." Most of the
1
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existing traffic of 40,000 cars a day on Harbor Drive, Jackson explained, would
be routed not only to the Stadium Freeway, but also to Front, First, and
Second avenues. "The Marquam Bridge is now at capacity during certain
hours," he emphasized, "and traffic volume on and off the Stadium Freeway
is expected to push the flow on the Fremont Bridge to its capacity from the
day it is opened." Therefore, by 1978, Jackson declared, another bridge across
the Willamette, most likely between the Marquam and Ross Island bridges,
would be needed to link Interstate 5 with the future Mt. Hood Freeway.
Federal highway funds, however, would be available for construction of the
bridge. 2
Commissioner Frank Ivancie and Portland business leader Paul
Murphy announced that a long-range comprehensive development plan for
the downtown area, from Burnside to Market streets and from the Stadium
Freeway to the Willamette River, would be developed jointly by city, county,
and state agencies. The Portland Improvement Corporation (PIC), which was
organized in 1968 by downtown property owners and business interests and
included powerful civic leaders Glenn Jackson and Ira Keller, offered $100,000
to the cash-strapped city towards the over-all planning effort, estimated at
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$500,000. The PIC hired the consulting engineering firm Cornell, Howland,
Hayes & Merryfield (CH2M-Hill) to develop a plan for the waterfront area as
well as the downtown core. Ivancie cautioned that the plan would be based
primarily on "economic realities" and would not be "a Sunday supplement
program with a lot of pretty pictures that can never come true." Citizen
groups, the commissioner declared, would be directly involved in all stages of
the planning process through public hearings. "Any ultimate plan would not
be worth a dam," Herbert M. Clark, Jr., chair of the Portland Planning
Commission, argued, "unless it had the backing and approval of our citizens.
What we do now will determine the land use in the downtown area for the
next 100 years." It was estimated that the downtown plan would be completed
in 1971. 3
In its editorial "Promising Plan," the Oregonian argued that the joint
highway commission and city council plans were encouraging. It appeared,
the daily newspaper's editors declared, that the long held goal of many
Portlanders to take advantage of one of the city's greatest assets-the
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Willamette River-was finally at hand. The Oregonian pointed out that the
decline in traffic along Harbor Drive, a critical fact in the decision to eliminate
the riverfront highway, had been foreseen nine years prior in 1961 by those
who argued against the construction of the Ash Street ramp. Equally
significant to clearing the waterfront area to create a park, the daily
newspaper's editors insisted, was the decision to draw up a comprehensive
plan for the downtown area. Even though a plan satisfactory to both private
and public interests had not yet been achieved, the Oregonian argued, the joint
planning effort provided the promise of not only creating a world-class
waterfront park, but also increasing livability and convenience in the entire
downtown area. 4
Contrary to the Oregonian's optimism, the Oregon Journal, in its editorial
"Who's in Charge Here?" expressed embarrassment in the fact that the city
had been forced to delegate major responsibility for downtown planning to
the PIC. Citing a 1968 dispute between certain downtown business interests
and the planning commission over a proposed twelve-story parking garage on
the site of the old Portland Hotel, the Journal's editors argued that there was
potential for conflict between the PIC and the city government. Adding
confusion to the muddled situation, they declared, was the fact that other
studies, including the DeLeuw, Cather plan, were still in the works. The paper
quoted Herbert M. Clark, Jr. as stating, "If you were to ask me, 'Who's in
charge here?' I'd have to answer, I'll be damned if I know." Even though the
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Oregon Journal was enthusiastic about the highway department's
"willingness" to close Harbor Drive to open up the waterfront, it warned that
any study regarding the downtown area would need "adequate" input from
citizens groups. 5
At the end of July, the Oregon Journal followed up "Who's in Charge
Here?" with another editorial, "Plan Born Under a Cloud," in which the
editors expressed skepticism towards the PIC's decision to hire CH2M-Hill
instead of turning over the project to the planning commission. The Journal
printed portions of an open letter from Roger Shiels, president of the
American Institute of Architects' Portland chapter, and member of the City
Club's Committee on Journal Building Site and Willamette Riverfront
Development, to Mayor Terry Schrunk. Shiels insisted that the planning
commission was the "logical arm of the city to represent the people of
Portland" in the project. He furthermore argued that unless there was
"genuine input from professionals who will be its natural critics," as well as
from interested citizens groups, the plan, regardless of how sound, would be
viewed as nothing more than "the self-serving proposal of large downtown
business interests." In his response to Shiels' criticisms, Shrunk argued that
ultimately the city council was in charge because only they could adopt a plan.
The mayor reiterated that ample "opportunity for participation by all of the
various groups and interests" would be provided before any scheme was
adopted. Ultimately, the Oregon Journal argued, the success of the plan would
5
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depend "heavily" on how well the mayor and city council stuck to their
promise.6
A month and a half later, on September 10, the city council passed
Ordinance #131483, which authorized an agreement with the highway
commission to landscape the area of the former Journal Building, S.W. Harbor
Drive between Morrison and Salmon streets. Glenn Jackson stated that the
area was to be "appropriately landscaped for public use for the interim period
of approximately two years before the discontinuance of Harbor Drive." While
the state was chiefly responsible for the project, including all grading, seeding,
and installation of irrigation equipment, the city was to provide shrubbery
and approximately thirty trees. The site was to be developed into a large lawn
area with pedestrian walkways and park benches. The project was to begin
that winter. 7
On September 9, the day prior to the council's action, Glenn Jackson

sent a letter to Mayor Schrunk officially notifying him of the highway
commission's plan to close Harbor Drive in the spring of 1972. Jackson also
stated that the commission was "contemplating" a one-way couplet in which
Front Avenue would be a northbound street while First Avenue would be
southbound. Specifically, the plan called for connecting Front and First
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avenues to the Steel Bridge in the vicinity of N.W. Couch and Davis streets,
while connecting the southern section of Harbor Drive to Front and First in
the vicinity of S.W. Market and Harrison streets. It was estimated that the
couplet plan would cost around $2.5 million. Jackson stated that a public
hearing regarding the street proposals would be scheduled in the near future.
The city traffic engineer and planning commission were instructed to study
the plan and assess its compatibility with long-range planning for the
downtown area and the riverfront. 8
Three months later, in mid-December, the highway commission
announced it was scheduling a public hearing for January 14, 1971 at the
Portland Civic Auditorium. Plans called for the proceedings to commence at 2
p.m., continue throughout the afternoon, and then reconvene at 7:30 p.m. after
a recess for dinner. To notify all "interested persons" of the sessions, the
commission published public notices in the local papers on December 14 and
January 8. The commission stated that oral and/ or written statements would
be accepted at the formal hearing and within ten days afterwards. 9
Opposing the meeting as "premature," the planning commission
unanimously voted on December 21 to recommend to the city council that the
meeting be postponed. The PPC insisted that the hearings be delayed "at
least" until the comprehensive downtown plan was completed. Lloyd Keefe,
8
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director of the planning commission, argued that changes made by the state
would not only determine the shape of the waterfront but would eliminate
several planning options for the downtown area. "There is no need to be hasty
in making a decision about the future status of Harbor Drive," Keefe insisted,
"as no difficulties will result if it remains open after the Fremont Bridge is
completed and in use." To make a decision on the riverfront highway now, he
explained, would defeat the "orderly approach" of preparing the downtown
comprehensive plan. 10
In letters to Glenn Jackson, both Herbert M. Clark, Jr. and Roger Shiels
concurred with Keefe. Clark declared that the planning commission did not
want "preliminary alternative plans being studied to be implanted or carried
to a degree of commitment or of 'no return.'" Meanwhile, Shiels argued that
the public hearing should not take place until both the DeLeuw, Cather study
and the downtown plan were completed. "An intelligent decision cannot be
made on how or whether to close Harbor Drive," Shiels insisted, "until all the
alternatives have been explored and a consensus developed." Nevertheless, on
December 23, the city council declined to heed the planning commission's
advice and instead voted to go forward with the public hearing.
Commissioner lvancie stated that the session would simply consist of a
discussion of preliminary plans for the benefit of the highway department and
downtown planners. "The die is not cast at the hearing," he stated. Six days
later, in a letter to the task force and advisory council, Glenn Jackson declared
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that the decision on alternative routes from the closure of Harbor Drive "could
possibly be delayed if necessary." 11
At the end of 1970, DeLeuw, Cather released its "Harbor Drive Study,"
which concluded that the closure of the roadway would cause "tolerable"
short-term traffic conditions but in the long-term necessitate expanding the
capacity of the area highway system, especially Interstate 5. The consultants
examined five plans for alternative routings for auto traffic if Harbor Drive
were removed. The consultants declared that alternative five, which called for
the building of a north-south expressway in the vicinity of East 201h Avenue,
was infeasible as the highway would not provide sufficient relief to Portland's
freeways to prevent over loadings. In addition, significant community
opposition, based on environmental considerations, had "deferred indefinitely
the construction of the facility." The consultants further stated that alternative
one, the cut-and-cover plan, was unsatisfactory, as it would enable only 15.8
acres to be developed for a waterfront park and would entail "numerous
hidden costs" as well as sound and air pollution problems.12
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The consultants stated that alternative three-Front Avenue as a highcapacity six-lane, two-way surface street-was unsatisfactory because it
would provide for only a 160-foot strip for public development while creating
a barrier between downtown and the waterfront that would offset the benefits
of removing Harbor Drive. Alternative two, the Front and First avenues
couplet scheme, the report concluded, was satisfactory given that 28.6 acres
would be available for development and the costs of the plan would be low.
They viewed alternative four-the long-term plan to build another Willamette
River bridge in the corridor between the Marquam and Ross Island bridges
while upgrading Interstate 5 and the Stadium Freeway-as the most desirable
plan because it would create a viable riverfront park connected to downtown
while solving future traffic problems. 13
On January 8, 1971, the task force and advisory committee voted to
proceed with steps to close Harbor Drive when the Fremont Bridge was
completed, instead of waiting until all alternatives were considered and
adopted. "You have to make a start," Glenn Jackson explained, "If you just
wait for an over-all program, you might never get it off the ground." Members
of the task force argued that to leave Harbor Drive open after the completion
of the freeway loop was to invite traffic to establish itself on the riverfront
highway as well as the Stadium Freeway and Fremont Bridge, making
relocation more difficult. Richard Ivey, director of planning for CH2M-Hill,
agreed that there was nothing objectionable to the closure. The task force and
13
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highway commission declared that it was prudent to allow ninety to 120 days
for agencies such as the Multnomah County Planning Commission, the
Portland Planning Commission, and the PIC to review and comment on
DeLeuw, Cather's "Harbor Drive Study." 14
Six days later, however, at the highway commission's public hearings,
attended by a total of 146 people, the majority of testimony from both public
officials and private individuals concurred with the elimination of Harbor
Drive but demanded that the removal of the riverfront highway be postponed
at least twelve to fifteen months. Significantly, Glenn Jackson did not attend
the hearing. Lloyd Keefe argued that not only was 120 days too short a time to
consider the "Harbor Drive Study," which would have ended on May 7, but
that a conceptual plan for the downtown area would not be ready until May 1.
"The development [of the riverfront and downtown] should be determined
first," Keefe insisted, "and then the traffic rearrangements can be decided
accordingly rather than the other way around." Meanwhile, some downtown
real estate developers advised that the Front and First avenues couplet would
adversely affect both the area south of the Hawthorne Bridge as well as the
Skidmore Fountain neighborhood. 15
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The strongest objections at the hearings were raised by Robert Belcher,
of the Riverfront for People Committee, AIA members Richard Norman and
Roger Shiels, and City Club member David J. Lewis. Expressing frustration at
their inability to be heard in the decision-making process, the dissidents
argued that the couplet plan would simply replace the riverfront highway
" ... with a new Harbor Drive made up of Front and First." Meanwhile, Alex
Pierce, an AIA architect and board member of the Portland Beautification
Association, objected that since a decision had already been made by the
commission, the hearing was a "sham." "I suggest that we go home," he
declared. On the other hand, Albert E. Owen, representing Local No. 8 of the
International Longshoreman's Union, argued against the proposed closure of
Harbor Drive by asserting that it would adversely affect not only the 35,000 to
40,000 workers who relied on the riverfront highway, but also would hurt the
Port of Portland's ability to keep costs low and compete with other harbors.
Owen denounced the couplet idea because it would funnel "100-footlong, 3tandem rigs" onto downtown streets, causing enormous safety problems. The
couplet would create such a barrier between downtown and the park, he
claimed, that few people other than "winos" would actually venture to the
waterfront. 16
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In response to the public hearing, both the Oregonian and the Oregon

Journal argued that more studies were needed before Harbor Drive was
closed. In its editorial "No Rush on Closing Harbor Drive," the Journal's
editors joined those who preferred that plans for the riverfront wait until the
completion of the downtown plan. "It is far more important," they argued,
"that the West Side waterfront be redeveloped right than that it be done fast."
Meanwhile, despite Albert Owen's objection, the Port of Portland Commission
voted on February 10 in support of the highway department plan on the
condition that interchanges be built to funnel truck traffic from the northwest
industrial area onto the Fremont Bridge and Stadium Freeway. Edward G.
Westerdahl II, executive director of the port, declared that he had received
"personal assurance" from Glenn Jackson that Harbor Drive would not be
closed until adequate means for moving traffic to and from the industrial area
had been worked out. 17
Glenn Jackson now asked the city council to evaluate the highway
commission's plan with respect to whether Harbor Drive should be vacated
and what steps should be taken to handle traffic, given the closure. The
council requested that Commissioner of Pubic Works Lloyd Anderson
examine the recommendation and ask various agencies to comment on the
matter. As urban historian Carl Abbott has explained in Portland: Planning,

Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City (1983), the council was
17
"SW Harbor Closing Supported," The Oregof!ian, 11February1971, 1 (first quote); "No Rush
on Closing Harbor Drive," The Oregon Journal, 13 February 1971, 10 (second quote); "Harbor
Drive Closure Now or Later?" The Oregonian, 21January1971, 30; "Harbor Drive: Close it
Now or Wait for Downtown Plan," The Oregonian, 26January1971, 17.
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undergoing dramatic changes in the late 1960s that signaled the end of the
reigns of the politicians who had run the city for over a decade. This process,
which began in October 1969 when Anderson was appointed to the city
council after the death of William Bowes, continued in March 1970, as Connie
McCready replaced Stanley Earl, becoming only the second woman to serve
on the council. Both Anderson, who had previously been chief planner at
CH2M-Hill, and McCready, who had been a strong supporter of civil rights
and environmental legislation during her two terms as a Republican state
legislator, were in their forties and were newcomers to city politics. In
November 1970, twenty-nine year-old Neil Goldschmidt was elected to fill the
seat vacated by Buck Grayson and young businessperson Tom Walsh barely
lost to the established Frank lvancie. The new members on the council
represented an altered political landscape based on demographic changes,
wherein the percentage of people aged fifteen to thirty-four in Portland had
increased from 22 percent to 29.5 percent between 1960 and 1970. 18
Three months later, on May 5, Commissioner Anderson submitted his
report recommending that the city council, Multnomah County, and the
highway commission pass a resolution agreeing that Harbor Drive be closed.
18

In the race for city commissioner, some conservative supporters of Frank Ivancie
derogatorily referred to Tom Walsh as "King of the Hippies." Meanwhile, many young people
were angered by Ivanice's tough stand against anti-war demonstrators utilizing the South
Park Blocks to protest President Richard Nixon's invasion of Cambodia. Abbott, Portland:
Planning, Politics, and Growth, 174-176 (first quote, 174; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael
Jenner, 22 January 2004; Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 389-91, 477, 483;
"'Radical' pushed for model city," The Arizona Republic, 23 February 2003,
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Oregonian, 23 December 2000, l.
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Before the closure could take place, however, Anderson argued that the
council must adopt a detailed development plan for the riverfront area,
approve a plan for a revised Front Avenue, and make an agreement with TriMet for better bus circulation for the downtown area. The Tri-County
Metropolitan Transportation District had been created in October 1969 by the
Oregon legislature to take over the troubled Rose City Transit Company. The
commissioner, in addition, insisted that the highway commission ensure an
access route between the Fremont Bridge and the northwest industrial area, as
well as construct two park-and-ride facilities adjacent to Interstate 205, which
bisected eastern Multnomah County. Anderson said it would be possible to
close Harbor Drive once the council completed its obligations by July 1973 and
once the state fulfilled its commitments. Even though many Portland officials
were opposed to the elimination of Harbor Drive, Anderson argued, their
opinions should be balanced against the long-term advantages to be gained
from such a policy.19
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Of those opposed to the State Highway Commission's plan, which included the city
engineer, the fire bureau, and the bureau of police, traffic engineer D.E. Bergstrom offered the
most adamant rejection. He argued that the closure would result in "serious" traffic
congestion and delays resulting in "severe" criticism of both the city and the state. Bergstrom
declared the benefits from a redeveloped waterfront area would be "overshadowed and
outweighed by the liabilities" caused by the closure. In his argument against the highway
commission's plan, Benjamin Bullwinkle, businessperson and frequent user of Harbor Drive,
insisted not only would the closure cause traffic delays, but, that a riverfront park would only
benefit the "itinerant alcoholics, drifters, and hippies." Instead of the closure, Bullwinkle
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sailors.'" Traffic Engineer to Public Works, 19 March 1971, City of Portland Archives (first,
second, and third quotes); Benjamin B. Bullwinkle to Mayor Terry Schrunk, 21February1971,
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Eight days later, on May 13, the city council unanimously accepted
Anderson's report. It also scheduled a joint public hearing with the highway
commission for June 18 to discuss the proposal. The following Wednesday, the
council passed an ordinance authorizing expenditure of $500,000 in federal
grant money to purchase right-of-way land along Harbor Drive from the state.
In return for the federal aid, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) garnered a lien on the property, committing the land for
park purposes only. In its editorial "Future of the Waterfront," the Oregon

Journal again argued that the city council was moving too quickly in deciding
the fate of the riverfront. The newspaper's editors insisted that no decision be
made without the guidelines from the comprehensive downtown study due to
be completed in 1972. 20
Two days before its second scheduled public hearing, the highway
commission cited "public opposition" to the couplet plan and announced a
new proposal that called for the closure of Harbor Drive by 1973 and the use
of Front A venue to handle both southbound and northbound traffic. The
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Oregon Journal, 8May1971, 2.
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commission now proposed to make Front Avenue more pedestrian-friendly
by adding traffic lights at busy intersections, providing walkway crossings to
the waterfront, and by mandating reduced vehicular speeds. The cost of the
new plan, mainly consisting of the construction of off-ramps to the north and
south of the closure area, was estimated to be $750,000, $1.75 million less than
the couplet idea. 21
The public hearing on June 18 produced generous support for the new
plan. Roger Shiels, reading a statement representing the City Club, suggested
that the proposal was "consistent with the goals outlined in the City Club's
interim report" and urged the city council to adopt it. Meanwhile, Robert
Belcher, of the Riverfront for People Committee, insisted that, while he
approved of the plan, he wanted a "definite date" for the closure of Harbor
Drive. Businessperson and public transportation advocate Ray Polani argued
it was "encouraging" that the highway commission had listened to the
overwhelming testimony against the couplet idea and responded with new
plans. "I feel that we have definitely moved in the right direction," Polani
stated, "I feel that this should be very heartwarming for the younger people in
our society."22
21

"Closure of Street to Wait Until '73," The Oregonian, 19 June 1971, 9 (first quote); "Summary
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Of those opposed to the highway commission's proposal, some
supported the removal of Harbor Drive but demanded more radical plans in
dealing with automobile traffic. Portland State University Professor Sam
Oakland of the Bicycle Lobby, for example, argued that automobiles, with the
exception of delivery trucks, should be removed from the downtown area
entirely. "I'm tired of seeing the same old tired designs coming from the same
old tired designers," he declared. Alex Pierce, who had referred to the January
public hearing as a "sham," objected that traffic on Front Avenue separated
the waterfront from downtown and prevented pedestrian access to the
riverfront. He added that attending meetings of the highway department was
like "buying a cheap suit." 23
In its editorial "The Waterfront and People," the Oregon Journal argued
that although the removal of Harbor Drive was going to be "painful" and
"costly," Portlanders were "paying for our past sins in locking up the
waterfront with highway and industrial development." The editors supported
any and all moves to reclaim the riverfront for "beauty and recreation."
Reversing past policy, the Journal commended the inclusive decision-making
process of the highway commission and city council, which it described as a
"fascinating study in democracy at work." 24

Michael Jenner, 22 January 2004; "Accord Seen on Harbor Drive Closure," The Oregon Journal,
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On September 23, the city council unanimously adopted Commissioner
Anderson's resolution declaring its "desire and intent" to close Harbor Drive
no later than July 1973. Earlier in the month, however, Glenn Jackson had
attempted to persuade the council to adopt a plan to close the riverfront
highway in November 1972, to coincide with the scheduled completion of the
Fremont Bridge, instead of awaiting detailed industrial freeway plans and
commitments from Tri-Met. "This Harbor Drive idea has been around for a
long time," Jackson stated, "and I'd like to live to see it finished." In late
November, nonetheless, the highway commission adopted Commissioner
Anderson's resolution. 25
In an interview with former city planning director Ernie Bonner, Lloyd
Anderson explained that his far-reaching ordinance would not have been
possible without Governor Tom McCall's support. "If the governor had
opposed [the closure]," he insisted, "then introducing an ordinance and
having the city council close a state highway right through the middle of the
city that carried 40,000 cars a day was not at all possible." In addition, both
Richard Ivey and Richard Brainard, members of the CH2M-Hill team that
helped develop the "Downtown Plan," stated that McCall was the major
impetus behind the highway commission's decision to close the riverfront
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highway. "[Jackson] was basically closing it for his boss," Ivey declared, "He
threw up his hands and he said, 'I'm just trying to help the govemor."' 26
A week after it adopted Anderson's resolution, the city council hired
the consulting team of Portland architectural firm Wolff Zimmer Gunsul
Frasca (WZGF); San Francisco landscape architectural firm Royston,
Hanamoto, Beck & Abbey; and San Francisco economic consultants Larry
Smith and Co. to develop a comprehensive plan for the waterfront area before
Harbor Drive was closed. The study was projected at $120,000, with the city
paying $72,000 and the state the remainder, and was set to begin in early 1972
to coincide with the basic concepts of the downtown plan. "What's exciting,"
architect Robert J. Frasca stated, "is there is some resemblance of reality to it.
With a little bit of luck, we could pull off something no one else in the country
has done." The council instructed the consultants to develop a plan that was
"as economically self-sufficient as possible." Financing for the area, they
stated, was to be generated from private development on the riverfront rather
than from city coffers. Larry Smith & Co. were directed to use "extensive
market studies" to explore the "amount and type" of private development
that might be encouraged on the waterfront property. 27
26
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Seven months later, in April 1972, the Portland Development
Commission (PDC) submitted Phase I of the Waterfront Study, which
established the basic design and financing strategies for the creation of the
park. They stated that preliminary estimates indicated that "substantial"
private development on the riverfront would be needed in order for the park
to be self-sufficient. This, however, the PDC concluded, was contrary to
community goals and to the guidelines of the downtown plan. They advised,
therefore, that the waterfront area and downtown core be designated for
urban renewal, making tax increment financing available for public
improvements. The PDC further recommended that the City Charter be
amended by a vote of the electorate to eliminate existing limits on permissible
amounts of tax increment financing. This, they stated, was "essential" in
maximizing the potential for revitalization of the waterfront area. 28
While the work for the Phase II Study was suspended by the city in
order to study and implement the urban renewal plan, the political climate at
city hall continued to change. In May 1972, Neil Goldschmidt defeated retired
industrialist Bill DeWeese to become the youngest mayor in Portland's
history. Even though DeWeese outspent Goldschmidt two-to-one in the most
expensive primary in city history, the younger candidate won 460 of 500
precincts as well as over 57% of the total vote. Goldschmidt had not only
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become the council's president in 1971, but had been serving as acting mayor
since Terry Schrunk's heart attack a month prior to the election. Goldschmidt's
political allies, commissioners Anderson and McCready, also won decisive
victories in the May primary. For proponents of a viable park on the
waterfront, the victories of Goldschmidt, Anderson, and McCready
represented a significant step forward. 29
Two months later, in early July, the State Highway Commission
released its environmental impact study for the closure of Harbor Drive.
George Baldwin, state highway administrator, argued that the closure of the
riverfront highway would not solve all of the anticipated city-wide traffic
problems but that both short-term and long-term inconveniences "must be
accepted" in the name of progress. Two projected problems, the report stated,
were a downgrade in the overall air quality in the downtown area and an
increase in the noise level, due to slowed traffic on Front Avenue. Baldwin
emphasized that the closure could be reversed or modified anytime the public
wanted but that development of the area would make this more difficult.
Contrary to the highway commission's report, however, the Portland

29
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Chamber of Commerce publicly urged the city council not to close Harbor
Drive. In October 1972, the chamber requested that the cut-and-cover plan be
further investigated as a means of creating a waterfront park while keeping
carbon monoxide levels down. 30
Four days before Neil Goldschmidt was sworn in as mayor, the city
council in December 1972 adopted the "remarkable" "Portland Downtown
Plan," which outlined its previously stated goals and policies for land use,
transportation, and the general environment in the downtown area. The
report was significantly influenced by a Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC),
which had been created in May 1971. The CAC, which was chaired by lawyer
and Irvington neighborhood worker Dean Gisvold, not only established its
independence from both the PIC and CH2 M-Hill, but also created a list of
fundamental downtown goals, including making the area pedestrian friendly.
The committee had met once a week from June 1971 through February 1972
and its members gathered input from more than a thousand Portlanders. In
February 1972, the CAC presented its set of "moral principles" to the city
council. City planners and CH2M-Hill then worked together to develop the
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ideas into specific proposals. The "Downtown Plan" contained "a dear
strategy [and] a new vision of downtown" as a "people place." 31
The plan described downtown as a "multifunctional district" that
emphasized a variety of activities. It organized the area into twenty-one
overlapping districts in an attempt to give downtown "a sense of order and
identity." San Francisco's exciting and unique downtown was a major
influence on the report. The key to the plan was the Transit Mall, which
allowed buses to be the dominant form of transportation along the office
corridor-Fifth and Sixth Streets-in order to speed-up bus service as well as
encourage the use of public transportation. Between September 1971 and
January 1972, the concepts of the Transit Mall were approved by Tri-Met, the
planning commission, and the city council. The plan also called for the
building of two parking garages with room for 1,300 cars near the retail core. 32
With regard to the riverfront, the "Downtown Plan" contained specific
goals, including the creation of a park with "unique activities through which
31
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city life can be enhanced." The waterfront, the scheme detailed, was to
provide an open space, fully integrated with adjoining areas, that would offer
a contrast to the "formal character of downtown" and act as a "magnet" to
create a "community focus." In its immediate goals for the riverfront, the
report declared not only should public use of the area be encouraged as soon
as Harbor Drive was closed, but that citizen involvement be emphasized in
the planning process. In order to "recapture the beauty and drama of the
Willamette," the plan emphasized activities that would take advantage of the
river as well as reducing its pollution. In its long-range goals for the area, the
plan stated that ample open space should be maintained, and "good physical
and visual access" should be developed in the park itself as well as in the
downtown area near the waterfront. To accomplish these goals, the report
insisted that the area be "pedestrian-oriented," for "mingling and
communicating," and be served by public mass transit. 33
Along with the dramatic changes in city hall and citizen involvement in
the "downtown revolution," the growth of neighborhood associations in every
section of Portland in the late 1960s and early 1970s greatly altered the
planning process. As Carl Abbott has detailed, during the 1950s and 1960s,
professional planners made critical decisions affecting neighborhoods with
little regard to the opinions of the residents living there. The prevailing belief
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among city officials was that the inner ring of residential neighborhoods was
in an inevitable process of decline and hence, could not be saved. By the late
1960s, however, angry local residents created neighborhood associations that
not only demanded a voice in the decision making process but also argued
their areas could be revitalized. By the early 1970s, the neighborhood
movement had a powerful influence on the city. 34
Arguably, the greatest victory for neighborhood associations was the
cancellation of the Mt. Hood Freeway. Since the early 1960s, the construction
of a freeway parallel to southeast Division and Powell streets had been
planned to link downtown with Interstate-205 in eastern Multnomah County."
Increasingly, however, neighborhood associations in the late 1960s, especially
in southeast Portland, began questioning the logic of building a highway that
would displace 1,750 households as well as numerous schools. By the early
1970s, a grassroots movement opposed to the freeway was barraging city hall
with complaints. In 1974, the city council, with Commissioner Frank Ivancie in
opposition, voted four-to-one to cancel plans for the freeway. Led by Mayor
Goldschmidt, a staunch supporter of the neighborhood movement, the council
diverted funds from the freeway to develop Portland's light-rail system
(MAX). The following year, Governor Bob Straub formally withdrew the Mt.
Hood Freeway from the interstate highway system. 35
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Like Portland, other major cities in the United States were shifting
away from exclusivity in planning in the late 1960s and 1970s and moving
towards a more representative process. In Twentieth-Century Richmond:

Planning, Politics, and Race (1984), urban historian Christopher Silver examined
the rise to power of the long-neglected African American community in
Richmond, Virginia during this period. In the 1950s and 1960s, city officials
had engaged in a strategy of downtown growth and city expansion as a means
of fending off Richmond's decline. The "progressives," who sought to
promote the city's progress through planning and economic development,
initiated urban renewal projects. Their goal was to make the downtown area
more attractive but the result was to destroy the inner city, predominately
black, neighborhoods. Ironically, as Silver detailed, projects such as the
construction of the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike actually furthered the
decentralization process it was seeking to combat. Dislocated African
Americans moved into predominately white neighborhoods, which in turn
increased white flight to the suburbs. By the 1960s, white city officials
desperately sought to annex adjacent counties as a means of increasing the
white population and stemming the rising tide of black influence. 36
During the 1970s, Richmond dismantled its federal urban renewal
program and witnessed increasing influence by ordinary citizens in city
planning decisions, most notably in the battles over the Fulton neighborhood
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and Washington Park. Richmond's leaders began to emphasize neighborhood
conservation as a means of curbing suburban flight. In 1977, Richmonders
elected their first African American majority to the city council. Even though
these changes in city hall did not bring about a radical shift in planning policy,
they resulted in more sensitivity to the needs of low-income neighborhoods.
For example, the new council invested nearly $3 million in the Jackson Ward
area, the historic center of the black population. Richmond also planned in the
late 1970s to make improvements to its riverfront as well as to improve
pedestrian circulation in the downtown area. 37
Another American city that shifted towards a more inclusive planning
process and emphasized a functional downtown was Omaha, Nebraska. In

The Changing Image of the City: Planning for Downtown Omaha, 1945.:.1973 (1992),
urban historian Janet Daly-Bednarek suggested that Omaha's officials
reevaluated their city planning based on economic changes that had been
taking place since the 1950s. Nebraska's largest city had shifted from being
predominately blue-collar-" the livestock and meatpacking center of the
nation"-to emphasizing white-collar sectors, including the insurance and
service industries. Daly-Bednarek utilized the two major city plans of the
1950s and 1960s, the "Omaha Plan" of 1956 and the Central Omaha Plan (1966),
to explain that not only had civic leaders ignored the already changing
economy, but they also had relied almost entirely on the private sector to
initiate proposed changes. Both plans emphasized the continued reliance on
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traditional industries and infrastructure improvements to combat the trend of
the declining downtown. City officials believed that if the downtown area was
accessible and cleaned up it would once again perform the dominant role it
had played in the past. 38
The collapse of the meatpacking industry in the late 1960s, however,
led city leaders to emphasize beautification and quality of life factors in city
planning to address the new dominance of white-collar industries in Omaha's
economy. Like Portland, Omaha's City Hall was undergoing dramatic
changes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ushering in a new generation of
politicians who had fresh ideas regarding city planning. Eugene Leahy,
Omaha's mayor from 1969 to 1973, not only increased the role of the public
sector in city planning decisions, but championed a scheme to restructure the
downtown area as a business and cultural center. The Central Business
District Plan of 1973 differed from previous post-war strategies in that it
emphasized input from a citizens advisory committee as well as from
professional planners. The key element of the plan was the Central Park Mall,
a "massive" area of greenery and water in the downtown area. 39
In May 1974, Portland moved forward with its own downtown
revitalization plan. That month, the highway commission officially closed
Harbor Drive between the Hawthorne and Steel bridges. Southbound lanes
were closed on May 23 and northbound lanes were closed the day after. In its
38
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editorial "Blacktop to Green," the Oregonian celebrated the end of the fortyone year-old highway, arguing that the vision of a waterfront park
overshadowed the short-term traffic problems produced by the closure.
Harbor Drive had served its purpose well, the newspaper's editors insisted,
"but this is a new era in which greenery and open space are valued over the
exhaust-filled lanes of macadam and concrete." The Oregonian argued that
easy pedestrian access from the downtown core and riverfront attractions
needed to be provided to make the park viable. "The people have recaptured
the river in downtown Portland after more than a century," the editors
declared, "Let's never let it go." In June, while the section between S.W.
Columbia and Clay streets was being tom up to allow the city a head start on
the development of a waterfront park, tents were placed along the route for
the annual Rose Festival. 40
That November, Portlanders voted to remove the City Charter debt
limit on tax increment financing, opening the way to greatly enhance the
ability to build an open green space on the waterfront without "substantial
private development." A year-and-a-half prior, in April 1973, the city council

40
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had followed the recommendations of the "Phase One" report by instructing
the Portland Development Commission to prepare the necessary documents
for a Waterfront Urban Renewal Area and retained the prestigious planning
firm of Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill to help develop the plan. A year later, in
April 1974, the city council approved an urban renewal designation for the
area adjacent to the riverfront. The vote ended the two-year delay on planning
for the area as the Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership and Royston,
Hanamoto, Beck, & Abey resumed their studies. 41
As the year 1974 came to a close, city traffic engineer D. E. Bergstrom
submitted the "Harbor Drive-'Before' and' After' Traffic Study." Bergstrom
stated that with regard to volume and travel time in the downtown area, only
Front Avenue exhibited any noticeable change. While the traffic volume on
the avenue had nearly doubled, an increase in automobile speed had caused a
decrease in travel time. Prior to the riverfront highway closure there had been
approximately 1,400 trucks on Harbor Drive and 600 trucks on Front Avenue
per twenty-four hour period. This level, however, had been decreased to 1,500
in the combined corridor following the closure. As traffic engineer Richard
Brainard recounted, the closure of the riverfront highway did not cause the
traffic chaos some had predicted. "Once Harbor Drive was closed, the next
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day the traffic disappeared," he stated, "There was no traffic jam. Nobody
could figure out where the traffic went." 42
Between 1970 and 1974, proponents of a waterfront park won a series of
important victories. The radical decision in 1970 to remove Harbor Drive not
only opened up the possibility of redeveloping the land as a park, but also
provided an opportunity to reorganize the downtown area. Importantly, the
highway commission listened to the negative testimony at the public hearing
on January 14, 1971 and responded with both a new plan that rejected the
Front and First avenues couplet and accepted Commissioner Anderson's
proposal to delay the closure of Harbor Drive until planning for the area could
be completed. Facilitated by the ascension to power of a younger generation of
city officials, Portland moved dramatically toward approval of the
"Downtown Plan" and an increase in tax increment financing. By 1974, the
question was not whether there should be a park along the riverfront, but
what the park was to look like.

42
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CHAPTERV
THE CREATION AND UTILIZATION OF TOM McCALL WATERFRONT
PARK
As 1975 began, the consulting firms Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca
Partnership of Portland and Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey of San
Francisco completed their public reviews of the waterfront park plan
alternatives, which had begun the prior September, and moved closer to
submitting their recommendations to the city. A year prior, in February 1974,
the firms had resumed work on Phase II of the Waterfront Study, which
focused on design options and an implementation strategy, after a two-year
delay. When the Portland City Council approved the urban renewal
designation for the riverfront area in April 1974, it ensured sufficient funding
for the creation of a viable park. The firms were given seven guidelines by the
city to consider as they developed their plan: create places to "observe river
activities," establish a "pedestrian promenade," supply places for "large
public gatherings," develop "waterfront oriented shops and restaurants" in
the adjoining areas of the park, encourage activities on the river such as
"public boat tours," design "visual and physical ties" linking the park with
downtown, and produce "attractive pedestrian spaces." 1

1

Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment of Conditions and Issues,"
April 2001, 21 (first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth quotes); Wolff

With these guidelines, the consultants prepared three separate
development schemes for the park, intending to draw out ideas to help
finalize the ultimate plan. In scheme one, the park would consist primarily of
open space, with areas of commercial activity located at the bridgeheads. In
scheme two, the riverfront would include community facilities such as a
theater and/ or an exhibition hall, surrounded by some large open areas. In
scheme three, the park would become a commercial activity center based on
Ghiardelli Square in San Francisco and Tivoli Garden in Copenhagen, with
open areas as well. After presentations to the city council, planning agencies,
and citizens groups, including the Citizens' Advisory Committee, the
consultants concluded that the "majority sentiment" favored the scheme
having the most open space, scheme one.2
From June 1974 through January 1975, city officials and the consultants
engaged in a review process to encourage community input regarding
preliminary concepts for Waterfront Park. This process of citizen participation
originated with and was carried forward by the "Downtown Plan" of 1972,
which detailed the organization and uses of the downtown area and the
riverfront. According to the consultants, the process of citizen involvement
was not only "experimental" but was a "pioneering effort at including direct
public participation in the planning of a major public facility." The

Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership, Portland, Oregon & Royston, Hanamoto, Beck & Abey,
San Francisco, California, "Final Report: Downtown Waterfront Park, City of Portland,
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"aggressive" strategy of citizen input, which produced several thousand
individual responses, was pursued through a variety of techniques, including
public meetings, extensive questionnaires, a booth at the annual Rose Festival,
and two all-day fairs and workshops (Waterfront Sunday in September and
Son of Waterfront Sunday in October). Input from groups, individuals, public
agencies, and each member of the city council was also gathered. According to
the consultants, the responses produced a coherent vision of a park with
activity areas within open natural spaces. 3
The seven-month review process produced six conclusions for
Waterfront Park and formed the basis on which the consultants designed their
final report. While there was almost unanimous agreement that the riverfront
should indeed be utilized as a park, some respondents favored the commercial
activity plan over the open space scheme as a means of drawing people to the
riverfront. Secondly, the consultants had originally recommended landscaping
that included "extensive mounds, beams and dense plantings," but this was
rejected for several reasons. For one, the police bureau noted that such
extensive growth, while lessoning traffic noise, would have increased the
incidences of concealed violence and would have made surveillance difficult.
Furthermore, it was noted that such landscaping would have been too
expensive to maintain and would have limited the uses to which the park
could be put. The consultants explained that the third conclusion-a partial
3
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removal of the seawall-was quite controversial. While many felt the removal
was essential to achieve "visual access" to the river, an equal number felt that
it would not be worth the risk in the case of flooding. 4
A fourth conclusion gleaned by the consultants was that while the
majority of responses favored some sort of park activities, including some
commercial use, leaving the area flexible was essential as well. Fifthly, the area
south of the Hawthorne Bridge was a much-discussed issue among
respondents. The consultants had originally proposed the creation of an
amphitheater but this plan received some negative feedback. Several people
questioned the scheme for a variety of reasons: Portland already had similar
facilities, traffic noise would limit the optimum use of the area, and the plan
would require some modifications to street patterns. The majority of
responses, however, favored upgrading the existing marina. Finally, the
consultants noted additional concerns that were raised: fire protection,
construction and maintenance costs, water safety, and impact on the skid road
population. They recommended further study of these issues. 5
On August 28, 1975, the city council adopted Resolution No. 31595,
which provided detailed guidelines for the design and development of
Waterfront Park. The consultants had completed and submitted their findings
to the city two months prior. During July and early August, city officials had
held public reviews and hearings to consider the consultants'
4
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recommendations. Five days after the Portland Development Commission
(PDC) had passed a motion endorsing the findings, the Portland Planning
Commission had determined on August 5 that the recommendations were
consistent with the previously stated goals of the "Downtown Plan" and it
endorsed the council's adoption. 6
Resolution No. 31595 detailed six policies for the creation of the park.
The riverfront was to be designed for both "activity centers" as well as
"generous, unstructured ... open grass 'meadows'." Secondly, the park was to
be fully integrated with the downtown area by converting Front Avenue into
a "tree-lined boulevard." Thirdly, the consultants' recommendations
emphasized physical and visual water contact through removal of the solid
balustrade on the seawall, addition of fountains and pools, and creation of
water-related development opportunities at the north and south ends of the
park. Fourthly, the resolution specified that while the Rose Festival was to be
accommodated, open grass areas would be emphasized. The fifth policy said
the park should be a place for pedestrians and bicyclists-not for cars-and
that public transportation would be provided to and from the riverfront. The
city council, not the consultants, added the sixth policy to the resolution,
which specified that "low or easy maintenance and operation of
improvements shall be the primary consideration" to park planning. In
addition, no improvements would be made without assurance that the funds
6
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would be available. The resolution also contained a section on procedures for
future plans for the park. In the first procedure, the plan stated that any
changes or additions to the park would have to fit within the six adopted
policies. The second procedure directed the development commission to
implement plans for the creation of Waterfront Park as soon as possible.7
In late August, the consultants released "Final Report: Downtown
Waterfront Park, City of Portland, Oregon," which was the guiding document
for the park until 2003. The fifty-eight page report chronicled the history of the
riverfront, some of the events that led to the creation of the park, as well as
immediate, three-year, and long-term development schemes for the area. Of
great importance, emphasized the consultants, was that a "significant portion"
of the park be reserved for later use. For its immediate plan, the consultants
recommended initiating both the second policy from Resolution No.
31595-Front Avenue development-and a portion of the third policy
involving removal of the balustrade. Interestingly, with regard to the
balustrade, the scheme involved utilizing new concrete panels as the
foundation for the esplanade along the river's edge, which could also be
quickly lifted vertically into place on top of the seawall in case of a flood. 8
In its three-year plan for Waterfront Park, the consultants explained
that their scheme was but one means of interpreting the various policies
7
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contained in the city's resolution. In its plan, they divided the linear urban
park into five distinct areas. For the South Auditorium District, area one, the
consultants envisioned upgrading the existing boat moorage for recreational
activities and creating a small commercial center. The two blocks east of Front
Avenue, furthermore, an area purchased by the city from the Multnomah
Plywood Company in July, was to be utilized for the building of a hotel and
for providing "people-oriented activities." For the Hawthorne Bridge District,
area two, the consultants recommended remodeling the old Visitors
Information Center into a restaurant to attract people to the riverfront and
creating a Main Street pedestrian area between the park and Third Avenue as
a means of developing a major residential complex. 9
For area three, the Yamhill District, the consultants recommended the
creation of a linear lagoon of approximately two feet in depth, stretching from
Salmon Street to the Morrison Bridge, as a safe alternative to physical contact
with the river. The Morrison Bridge District, area four, would be built-up as a
concentration of shops and restaurants of approximately 30,000 to 40,000
square feet to provide both an all-weather activity center as well as a source of
revenue for offsetting park maintenance costs. Meanwhile, virtually all of the
area between the Morrison and Burnside bridges was recommended as open
flexible space for uses such as the annual Rose Festival, play and recreation,
and a resource for future generations. For area five, the Skidmore
Fountain/Old Town District, the consultants recommended extending the
9
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Skidmore Fountain Plaza to the river's edge through the creation of a large
hard-surfaced area to accommodate gatherings and provide a passive area to
counter the activities to the west of Front Avenue. Finally, the area between
the Burnside and Steel bridges was to be left undeveloped and set aside for
future development. 10
The consultants noted that several park elements received strong
support and should therefore by considered for long-term development plans.
While they noted that the improvements to Front Avenue would better
connect the Waterfront Park to the downtown area, the consultants added that
only the closure of the boulevard would completely unite the two areas.
Secondly, much support emerged for a Tivoli Garden type entertainment
center in the park, with the area between the Burnside and Steel bridges
suggested as a possible location. Also, the consultants noted that part of the
South Auditorium District could be utilized for the building of a mediumsized theater to compliment the Civic Auditorium. Finally, there was support
for adding sporting activities (tennis courts, softball fields) and community
facilities (indoor tennis courts, indoor swimming pools). 11
Starting in 1976, the development commission began the construction
of Waterfront Park, which occurred in five phases over seventeen years at the
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cost of approximately $20 million. The first project, Phase 1, involved
redesigning Front A venue as a boulevard. This project included reducing the
traffic lanes from six to four, widening and adding trees to the west sidewalk,
and adding ornamental lighting. Certain elements of the plan were not
implemented, however. Some of the pedestrian sidewalks were not aligned
and the planting buffer on the park side of the avenue was not added due to
high costs. The next year, the Phase 2 project, from the Morrison to Burnside
bridges, was initiated. The construction included open meadows bordered by
trees, a wide esplanade walkway, and the removal of the solid balustrade. 12
The aim of city planners was to provide a public gathering place for
each section of the park. In this case, the Phase 2 project included the
construction of the Ankeny plaza, which contained a stage area as well as wall
seating. Also, the Battleship Oregon Memorial, located between S.W. Oak and
Pine streets, was upgraded with new paving and a raised planter. The
Battleship Oregon, which had served in both the Spanish-American War and
World War I, had been utilized as a floating military museum between 1925
and 1942. In 1944, the mast of the ship was dedicated as the Battleship Oregon
Mast and Park at its current location. Thirty-two years later, at the
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bicentennial celebration on July 4, 1976, the mast was rededicated and a time
capsule with artifacts was buried at the site, to be sealed until 2076. 13
On Sunday July 16, almost nine years after Robert and Allison Belcher,
along with Jim Howell, had formed the Riverfront for People Committee to
fight for the creation of a viable park along the riverfront, Waterfront Park
officially opened. The dedication ceremony at the Battleship Oregon
Memorial, which coincided with the beginning of the Neighborfair festival,
included speeches by Governor Bob Straub and Mayor Neil Goldschmidt
along with a performance by gospel singer Willa Dorsey. The Oregonian
declared that, "Portland historically has returned to the place of its birth .... "
The opening of the park was another success for Mayor Goldschmidt (1973-79)
in converting the ideas of the "Downtown Plan" into reality. Ernie Bonner, the
planning director in the 1970s, declared that Goldschmidt was "the perfect
person to come into the mix. He was charismatic ... and radical." Along with
the creation of Waterfront Park, Goldschmidt was also responsible for
overseeing the completion of the Transit Mall in 1977, as well as ensuring the
creation of Portland's light rail system (MAX) and Pioneer Courthouse
Square. 14
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In 1984, Phase 3, the South Waterfront "Bowl" section of the park, was

completed. The area was designed with a large bowl shaped lawn, located just
south of the Hawthorne Bridge, to be used for large-scale concerts during the
summer, such as the Blues Festival and Oregon Symphony concerts, as well as
a pedestrian path running along the river's edge. The area just south of the
bowl area, RiverPlace, was being developed by the PDC as a residential,
commercial, and marina complex. The ten-acre area had been purchased by
the city council in 1978 as an urban renewal project. One year prior, in 1983,
Waterfront Park was renamed Tom McCall Waterfront Park in honor of
Oregon's former governor whose leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s
was instrumental in the decision to dose Harbor Drive and build a viable
riverfront park. 15
Two years later, the area between the Hawthorne and Morrison
bridges, Phase 4, was completed. Whereas the first three phases of park
development closely mirrored the consultants' recommendations, the central
waterfront differed significantly from the "Final Report." City officials chose
to build neither the lagoon nor the proposed commercial development near

Portland, Or., 24 March 2003; Ernest Bonner, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript,
Portland, Or., 28 April 2003; Roger Shiels, interview by Michael Jenner, typed transcript,
Portland, Or., 22 January 2004; "Portland's Waterfront Park," 3 July 1978, Bonner, personal
files; Joan Biggs to Allison Logan Belcher, 10 July 1978, Robert and Allison Belcher, personal
files; "Wine, food, music, crafts, dance," The Oregonian, 14 July 1978, p. Dl; "Ship memorial
ftets new look," The Oregonian, 14 July 1978, p. T13.
5
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 9, 12, 22-23, 26, 36;
Benkendorf & Associates, "South Downtown Waterfront Study Workshop I," 29June1978,
Bonner, personal files; Abbott, Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth, 225; Lansing, Portland:
People, Politics, and Power, 407. Tom McCall died on January 8, 1983 at the age of sixty-nine.
Audrey McCall said of her late-husband, "I had him for forty-three years. It wasn't enough."
Brent Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate: Tom McCall and the Oregon Story (Oregon Historical Society
Press, 1994), 467 (first quote).

115

the Morrison Bridge. According to Bonner, not only was there a lack of funds
in the city's coffers due to an economic recession, but officials feared that the
proposed developments would not have produced large enough profits. It
was decided, therefore, to develop the area as open grass meadows. Phase 4,
however, did entail the creation of the Salmon Street plaza and the Salmon
Springs fountain, which is the most popular element in the park. The plaza
extends to the river's edge where the seawall was reconstructed with a
terraced area. In 1988, the city finished converting the old Visitor's
Information Center, located directly south of the Salmon Street entry, into
McCall's Restaurant. The building, originally built in 1949 for the Chamber of
Commerce, was later utilized to house the City Archives and City Mapping
Services. 16
In 1988, ten years after the opening of the park, the Portland Bureau of
Parks and Recreation initiated the "Waterfront Park Management Study" to
deal with the high volume of summer events in the park that was causing
"significant" turf damage. Six years prior, the "Waterfront Park Study 1982"
had examined the status and future developments of the four-year old park
but had not addressed the issue of festivals. As the "Management Study"
detailed, two major public events were held in the park during the late 1970s:
the Rose Festival and Neighborfair. Within a few years, however, nonprofit
organizations discovered that Waterfront Park was an ideal site for
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fundraising through large-scale community events. By 1988, seven major
public festivals, including the Cinco de Mayo Festival, the Blues Festival, and
the Bite, along with numerous minor events, were being held. If the situation
were to continue, the study warned, turf damage would become so great as to
degrade the park's "visual character and beauty." The study offered four
options for dealing with the problem: relocate events out of the park, prohibit
festivals for a six to eight week period in the middle of summer to allow for
turf regeneration, restrict the maximum attendance and duration of events, or
redesign sections of the park with a surface other than grass. The study
resulted in some restrictions being placed on events, an increase in permit
fees, a prohibition on festivals from October through mid-March, as well as
annual turf revitalization. 17
The next year, in 1989, the fifth phase, from the Burnside to Steel
bridges, was completed. The design for the northernmost section of the park
was inspired by the donation of one hundred Japanese cherry trees by the
Grain Importers Association to commemorate forty years of trade relations
between Portland and Japan. This section, which narrows considerably north
of the Burnside Bridge, also contains the Japanese American Historical Plaza:
Bill of Rights Memorial built in 1990. The Oregon Nikkei organization
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provided an endowment to cover all construction and maintenance costs. The
plaza features two bronze statues along with boulders that tell the story of the
110,000 people of Japanese ancestry who were interned during World War II.
The memorial stresses the importance of civil liberties. The plaza is located
near the original "Nihonmachi" or Japanese American community in
Portland. Before 1941, there were over eighty Japanese owned businesses
along N.W. Couch Street. The north waterfront park section also contains the
"Tomodachi" or "Friendship Circle." Sapporo, Japan, Portland's sister city,
recently donated $30,000 for an artwork display to be located at the site.18
As the 1990s began, the increased popularity of events in the park
during the summer months continued to raise concerns regarding overuse. In
July 1991, Director of Parks Charles Jordan appointed the Waterfront Park
Task Force to research the issue and make recommendations. The task force
held weekly meetings from August through October and gathered
information from diverse sources. As their report detailed, the numerous
events caused tension with both the concept of the park as a place for quiet
recreation and reflection as well as the city's ability to restore and maintain the
grass turf. Furthermore, many of the events utilized fencing to control
admissions, which resulted in large sections of the park excluding the public.
In late October, the task force made twenty-one recommendations to the city.
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In effect, it called for restrictions to be placed on events as well as increased
fees for park use. In addition, the panel recommended that capital
improvement options should be explored as a means of better accommodating
passive public use of the park. 19
Even though the task force's report resulted in minor improvements,
the pressure from events continued to overwhelm the park during the 1990s
as other additions were made. For example, in 1991, the Portland Police
Memorial was created directly adjacent to the northern slope of the South
Bowl. The Police Memorial Association had raised private funds in the late
1980s to pay for construction costs. The memorial contains a garden, plaza,
and a three-foot high semi-circular wall with plaques that commemorate
officers killed in the line of duty. It is located near the sites of the first
territorial prison and the original harbor patrol. The memorial is also visible
from the Justice Center and Police Headquarters. In 1994, the city added two
features to the park: the Oregon Maritime Museum and the Spirit of Portland.
The museum is located in the Steamer Portland, which is docked along the
seawall between the Morrison and Burnside bridges. The vessel is the last
operational wheel tug boat in the United States. In 1986, the Port of Portland
had planned to dock the steamer at Salmon Springs and convert it into a
restaurant. When the funds did not materialize, however, the steamer was
donated to the city. The Spirit of Portland, which is privately owned, is docked

19

Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 18; idem, "Waterfront Park:
An Assessment," 24-25; Waterfront Park Task Force, "Report on Waterfront Park Task Force,"
30 October 1991.
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along the seawall at Salmon Street and takes cruises up the Willamette River
to the Milwaukee Basin and back. This popular cruise averages approximately
90,000 passengers per year. 20
Between 1975 and 1989, the long-held dream of beautification
advocates to create a viable riverfront park became a reality. Extensive
planning, including significant citizen participation, was completed by the
consultants in 1975 and led to the city council's passage of Resolution No.
31595, which detailed the design and development scheme for Waterfront
Park. The consultants' "Final Report" illustrated the plan for the area, which
consisted of large open areas with activity centers located near the bridges.
While city planners closely followed the consultants' recommendations in the
first three phases of park development, in the fourth phase, the area between
the Hawthorne and Morrison bridges, they opted for open grass spaces
instead of commercial development. In the late 1980s and 1990s, city officials
struggled to effectively handle the numerous large-scale summer events that
were overwhelming the park. The function of the park as either a place for
passive recreation or as the center of festivals was becoming increasingly
problematic.

20

Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 12, 31, 33-34; idem,
"Police Memorial Review," 25 April 1989, Portland City Archives. The first police officer
killed in Portland in the line of duty was Thomas G. O'Connor, who died on August 30, 1867
after suffering gunshot wounds a week prior in front of Oro Fino Saloon. Jewel Lansing,
Portland: People, Politics, and Power, 124.

120

CONCLUSION

The City of Portland began preparing an updated master plan for Tom
McCall Waterfront Park in 2001. The original "Final Report: Downtown
Waterfront Park" of 1975 had provided the blueprint for the greenway's
development but since that time unforeseen problems had arisen. While the
park was heavily utilized from March to October, visitation dropped-off
dramatically during the wet winter months. City planners hoped to
adequately address the competing functions of the greenway as a place for
large-scale festivals and as a space for quiet recreation. During 2000, there
were eleven events held in Waterfront Park, each attracting over 10,000
visitors. Of these, five drew over 50,000 people. In all, Portland Parks and
Recreation estimated festival attendance at over one million. During the
summer and fall, festivals, which often required fencing, took up much of the
park and caused significant turf damage that required restoration. The long
duration of some of the events exacerbated the situation. While most events
lasted a single weekend-Friday to Sunday-the Rose Festival lasted the
entire month of June. 1

1

In 2000, the heaviest use of the park during non-festival summer months occurred during
the lunch hour from 11am to lpm and also from 3pm to 5pm on weekdays. By far, the largest
event was the Rose Festival, which drew 350,000 people to the park. Portland Parks and
Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment of Conditions and Issues," April 2001, 2, 4, 5, 38;
idem, "Waterfront Park Master Plan, Portland, Oregon," 2003, Multnomah County Library,
10-12.

1"

Another problem city officials described was that S.W. Naito Parkway
"visually and functionally" separated the park from downtown. In 1976, the
city had redeveloped the avenue as Phase One of the park's construction.
Some key components of the plan, however, were not implemented-the
sidewalk buffer on the park edge of the boulevard and some of the pedestrian
crosswalks were not aligned-resulting in inadequate pedestrian circulation.
The lack of sufficient entry points into the park, furthermore, resulted in
jaywalking, which became dangerous during popular events. As part of the
renovation of S.W. Naito Parkway scheduled for 2005, the city proposed the
construction of additional pedestrian crossings into the park and a bicycle
lane. Another concern with the park was the presence of transients and drug
dealing activity around the Ankeny Pump Station. City officials acknowledged
part of the problem was the lack of attractions in that section that could draw
other visitors. 2
As with the "Final Report" of 1975, significant citizen participation was
emphasized in the development of the new "Master Plan." Planning was
guided by a Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC), which met from July 2001
through December 2002. The CAC represented a balance of interests including
those of downtown businesses and open space advocates. Harriet Cormack, a
developer who helped create RiverPlace, chaired the CAC. The process of
"citizen involvement" included a community survey, three rounds of
discussion with focus groups, and four public meetings. By January 2002,
2

Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park: An Assessment," 5-6, 21-22; idem,
"Waterfront Park Master Plan," 5-6, 32, 82.
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planners had developed three park options: 1) an urban grid, 2) a river
landscape, and 3) a meandering promenade with open spaces and activity
areas. At the public forum on January 16, 256 people out of an attendance of
over 650 chose to fill out comment cards. While a majority preferred the third
option, many recommended "combining" and "simplifying" elements from all
three schemes. With this information, city planners began designing a new
plan. 3
On May 30, city officials held another public forum to gamer feedback
on the new draft concept for the park. One-third of the 129 people who
attended completed comment cards. The scheme was also displayed at the
Rose Festival Waterfront Village from May 31 through June 9. While over
2,000 people spent time in the booth, only fifty-nine completed comment
cards. Among respondents, there was "widespread" support for the plan. City
planners then proceeded to finalize the scheme. At the last open house on
November 19, a total of ninety people attended the afternoon and evening
meetings to review the final plan. Even though the scheme was generally

3

On January 14, 2002, a panel discussion on the history of Waterfront Park was held. The
panel included Riverfront for People Committee co-founder Robert Belcher and former
planning director during the 1970s Ernie Bonner. Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront
Park Master Plan," 19-30; idem, "Newsletter No. 4," February-March 2002 (first and second
quotes); idem, "Newsletter No. 1," August-September 2001; idem, "Waterfront Park Master
Plan: Public Forum - Summary of Public Input," October 24, 2001; idem, "Waterfront Park
Master Plan: Focus Groups - Round 1 Summary," August-November 2001; idem, "Waterfront
Park Master Plan: Survey #1 Results Summary," November 2001; idem, "Newsletter No. 2,"
December 2001-January 2002; idem, "Newsletter No. 3," January 2002; idem, "Waterfront Park
Master Plan: Public Meeting #2 Results Summary," April 2002; idem, "Newsletter No. 5," July
2002; idem, "Waterfront Park Master Plan: Public Meeting #3 Results Summary," July 2002;
idem, "Creating a Great Portland Waterfront," November 2002.
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supported, some people expressed concerns that Naito Parkway would
continue to be a significant barrier between the park and downtown. 4
In late 2003, Portland Parks and Recreation released the "Waterfront
Park Master Plan," which detailed the long-term development plan for the
greenway. The scheme divided the mile-long, thirty-seven acre linear park
into five distinct areas. The Bowl area, the southernmost section of the park,
was designated to remain a grassy open space serving as a venue for concerts
and performances. At the western edge of the Bowl, a series of terraces were
to be added for enhanced event seating. The plan for this area also called for
the creation of a level path at the eastern edge of the Bowl linking the
greenway with RiverPlace and for the addition to the beach area of riparian
plantings and a rock facing. 5
The Salmon Springs Fountain area was designated to serve as one of
two major activity centers in the park. In order to accomplish this, some type
of facility near the fountain was to be used to attract people throughout the
year and act as an "anchor" for the southern section of the park. City planners
were unsure, however, whether the Yeon Building, now functioning as
McCall's Restaurant, could serve for this purpose. The fountain area was to be
enhanced for both summer and winter use through the addition of a "buffer"
area to include seating and shaded areas as well as an activity center
accommodating vendor carts. A set of terraces to offer views of the river and

4

Ibid., Portland Parks and Recreation, "Public Meeting #3 Results Summary" (first quote, 1).
The Master Plan was approved with minor changes by the city council in May 2003.
Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 9, 47, 65-66.
5
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provide a multi-use performance space was designed for the grassy area in
between the Hawthorne Bridge and the fountain. The Maritime Museum
Sternwheeler Portland and Battleship Oregon Memorial were to be relocated
from in between the Morrison and Burnside bridges to the seawall just north
of the Hawthorne Bridge. 6
The area between Salmon Springs and the Morrison Bridge was
designated "Waterfront Plaza," an all-weather "destination space" for hosting
events and producing winter programs. The plaza was also designed to
include the addition of two entry points at S.W. Morrison and Yamhill streets
and a new curved pathway to extend over the river. The area between the
Morrison Bridge and Ankeny Pump Station was designated "The Meadow."
This open grassy area was designed to provide a site both for overflow from
events and for quiet recreation. The scheme for this area also included
lowering a 900-foot length of the seawall an estimated eight feet to provide
more direct views of the river. City planners acknowledged that this area
could be flooded during a 100-year flood event, as had occurred in 1996.7
The Ankeny Pump Station Area was selected as the second activity
center for the park through the additions of an interactive water feature, a
visitor services building, a new dock, and an intimate seating area for
lunchtime visitors. The area around the water feature was to be "versatile and

6

Ibid., 9, 45, 66-70 (first quote, 67, second quote, 69).
The long-term plan for this area also included the creation of residential developments
immediately west of the park. Ibid., 9-10, 45, 70-75 (first and second quotes, 70, third quote,
72); Jewel Lansing, Portland: People, Politics, and Power 1851-2001 (Oregon State University
Press, Corvallis: 2003), 456.
7
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flexible" to allow for a variety of year-round activities. A curved pathway
through the activity area was designed to reach out over the seawall for better
river views. For the northernmost area of the park-the Burnside to Steel
bridges-the Master Plan detailed the addition of a new floating walkway to
connect the park to the Willamette Greenway Trail and the McCormick Pier
apartments, with two additional entry points to the park from Old
Town/ Chinatown. 8
Because of Portland's economic downturn in 2002, funding for the new
Master Plan project did not materialize. Since the total cost of the scheme was
estimated at $45 million, the city hoped to implement the plan gradually over
the next fifteen to twenty years. Expensive additions, such as Waterfront Plaza
and the development of the area between the Burnside and Steel bridges
including the floating walkway, were included in phases beyond 2015.
Between 2003 and 2010, the city recommended initiating the improvements to
the Bowl, Salmon Springs Fountain, and Ankeny Pump Station areas. City
planners acknowledged that in the long-term development of the park, some
changes to the scheme were possible, if they were consistent with the
recommendations of the report. 9
This thesis has chronicled the history of Portland's downtown west side
riverfront during the twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1943, numerous
outside planners called for the creation of a park along the waterfront to
enhance the area. Despite this advice, city officials instead initiated
8
9

Portland Parks and Recreation, "Waterfront Park Master Plan," 10, 46, 75-9 (first quote, 75).
Ibid., 83-91.
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infrastructure improvement projects, including the construction of the seawall
in 1929 and Harbor Drive in 1942. The creation in 1933 of the Public Market
Building on the riverfront just north of the Hawthorne Bridge turned out to be
one of the city's biggest boondoggles. By the 1950s, it was apparent that the
sixteen-foot wide esplanade along the river's edge was an inadequate space
for the popular annual Rose Festival.
The possibility of a viable waterfront park appeared remote when the
city council, in the spring of 1961, approved the construction of the Ash Street
overpass, which would have obstructed the last open area along the
riverfront. A groundswell of opposition led by architects Dan McGoodwin
and Lewis Crutcher along with the Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, however,
challenged the project. The cancellation of the overpass project in August 1961
marked the first time in Portland's history that waterfront beautification
advocates had influenced plans for the area. Seven years later, City
Commissioner Frank Ivancie arranged for Portland to buy the old Journal
building and have it tom down. Governor Tom McCall, seeing an opportunity
to create a riverfront park, created the Intergovernmental Task Force for
Waterfront Development, chaired by Glenn Jackson, to examine the issue and
make recommendations.
The year 1969 marked the paradigm shift for the development of the
riverfront area from exclusivity to a more inclusive process. In July, the
Portland City Club's Committee on the Journal Building Site and Willamette
Riverfront Development, which included future city commissioner and mayor
127
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Neil Goldschmidt, initiated the cancellation of the Ivancie-Jackson unilateral
plan to widen Harbor Drive. The Committee's "Interim Report" in August
lambasted the secrecy of the task force and argued that no decision for the
area be made until adequate studies were completed. Inspired by the
document, Robert and Allison Belcher, along with Jim Howell, formed the
Riverfront for People Committee and held two high profile picnics in August
and September at the old Journal building. The group not only demanded
public hearings on the issue but also recommended the removal of Harbor
Drive. At the public hearing at Portland City Hall in October, attended by
over 500 people, including numerous organizations brought in by the
Riverfront for People Committee, the task force received a clear message to
move more slowly and allow for public participation. Accordingly, Governor
McCall instructed Jackson to implement many of the public's
recommendations, including the creation of a citizens advisory committee.
In July 1970, Glenn Jackson announced both plans for the removal of
Harbor Drive, which was eventually closed in 1974, and plans for the building
of a viable waterfront park. A year later, a group of open-space advocates
fought against and succeeded in canceling the task force's First and Front
avenues couplet plan. The beautification of the riverfront coincided with the
adoption of the "Downtown Plan" of 1972, which was a radical scheme to
make downtown pedestrian friendly and enhance both citizen livability and
Portland's attraction as a business and retail center. The early 1970s also
marked a transition in city hall from conservative white males to progressive
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politicians, who, as a group, were more diverse in age, gender, and race.
Thirty-two year old Mayor Goldschmidt, along with commissioners Lloyd
Anderson and Connie McCready, won a series of victories in the 1970s,
including turning the ideas of the "Downtown Plan" into reality and creating
Waterfront Park.
The process of citizen participation, which had been carried forward by
the "Downtown Plan," played an important role in defining the type of park
that was to be built along the riverfront. In August 1975, the city council
adopted Resolution No. 31595, providing detailed guidelines for the design
and development of Waterfront Park. Even though the consultants in their
"Final Report" recommended some commercial development in the park, city
officials instead chose an open space scheme. In 1978, nearly nine years after
the Riverfront for People Committee had formed, Waterfront Park officially
opened. By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the role of the park
as a place either for large events or quiet recreation was becoming increasingly
problematic.
This thesis has explored the manner in which beautification advocates
initiated a paradigm shift in city planning with regard to the development of
Portland, Oregon's downtown waterfront area. The period from 1965to1975
saw a change in attitude towards the downtown area in many U.S. cities. A
philosophy that emphasized livability and rejuvenation emerged as a reaction
against the destructive aspects of urban renewal. Portland in the late 1960s
and 1970s, with the removal of Harbor Drive and the creation of Waterfront
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Park, provides an excellent example of the battle against the ascendancy of the
automobile and the ability of citizen groups to effect city planning decisions.
Even with this paradigm shift it remains critical that city leaders and experts
continue to seek public participation instead of imposing their will on the
citizenry. Substantial input from broader segments of the public is essential
for decision making to be truly inclusive rather than representing only the
interests of the professional elite.
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